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INTRODUCTION
A LTHOUGH the Civil Aeronautics Act (Act) of 19381 has some
features which are unique, it approaches most of the problems of
common-carrier regulation along well-beaten paths. The Act's re-
quirement, for example, that air carriers file tariffs and adhere to their
provisions was anything but an innovation. It could find antecedents
in dozens of federal and state public utility 'statutes. It was a regula-
tory device which had stood the test of experience-of administrative
interpretation and application and of judicial scrutiny, in scores and
scores of cases. Its purposes were clear and, with such a rich heritage
of statutory and decisional precedent, one would have supposed that
its effects were too. But in the ten years since the enactment of the
Civil Aeronautics Act, the requirement has proved to be a source of
controversy and debate- and some litigation.
What is the effect of the requirement upon the relationship be-
tween the carrier, on the one hand, and a passenger or shipper, on the
other? The Act expressly requires that the carrier adhere to its tariffs;
but are the tariffs equally binding on either passenger or shipper? For
example, may the latter rely upon special terms and conditions of the
contract of carriage not embodied in the tariffs? May he attack tariff
152 Stat. 973, 49 USCA §401 et seq. (Supp. 1947).
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provisions retroactively and avoid their application to him? May he,
after receiving the transportation, attack the tariff rate as unlawful and
recover damages? May he escape a tariff provision establishing a limit
on the carrier's liability on the ground that it is invalid? If so, in
what forum are those remedies available, and what tests or standards
of validity are to be applied? Does the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB)
have primary jurisdiction to pass on the lawfulness of tariff provisions,
or may a court assume such jurisdiction? In either event, are the stand-
ards of lawfulness prescribed by the Act exclusive, or can the question
be considered as a matter of general law?
These are typical questions which have been raised repeatedly
since the Act became effective. The few reported decisions do not
answer them either completely or consistently. It is appropriate, there-
fore, to examine them further. A thorough consideration of all of
them would not be -possible in one article, but an effort will be made
to find the correct answers to some of them, so that the legal effects of
the tariff-filing requirement will be clear, at least in general outline.
Before undertaking to examinie the principal questions, it might
be well to consider briefly the purpose of the tariff-filing requirement,
as evidenced by its historical background, and by the relevant pro-
visions of the Act itself.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE TARIFF-FILING REQUIREMENT
The precise origin of the notion that a person engaged in a public
calling should be required to publish tariffs, setting forth his charges
and other terms of his offer to serve the public, does not seem to be
known. There is evidence that iL was employed, both in this country
and in England, prior to the adoption of the Interstate Commerce
Act (ICA) in 1887, but its principal development as a regulatory de-
vice stems from experience under that Act.2
Prior to enactment of the ICA, railroads had been relatively free
to pursue their business without legislative interference. Discrimina-
tion, through preferences to favored individuals and localities, was
rife. Practices of railroads have been characterized as a system of
secret and special rites; rebates, drawbacks and concessions for the
purpose of fostering monopoly and preventing free competition.3
Public reaction against those discriminatory practices appears to have
been manifested first through the Granger Movement following the
224 Stat. 379 (1887), 49 USCA §1 et seq. (Supp. 1947). Originally enacted
as the "Act to Regulate Commerce," it became the "Interstate Commerce Act" by
a provision in the Transportation Act of 1920 (41 Stat. 499) ; and by a provision
of the Motor Carrier Act, 1935 (49 Stat. 543), the Act as it stood became "Part I"
with specific provision that it might continue to be cited as the "Interstate Com-
merce Act," and Part II, which was added, might be cited as the "Motor Carrier
Act, 1935." The special designations of Parts I and II for citation purposes were
eliminated by the Transportation Act of 1940 (54 Stat. 919) and the four parts
of the ICA are now to be cited as such.
3 In the Matter of Underbilling, 1. ICC 633, 634 (1888).
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Civil War.4 The Movement resulted from the clamor of small farmers
in the Middle West against maintenance of high transportation charges
in face of falling grain prices. Rate wars among railroads were preva-
lent and resulted in fluctuating rates between competitive points, but
high rates between non-competitive points remained virtually un-
changed. Feelings ran high during this period, and there were
charges that railroads, controlled by Eastern capital, were attempting
to dominate the economic life of farmers and of the Middle West.5
Initially, the Movement seems to have been directed against extor-
tionate charges made by railroads, and agitation for maximum-rate
laws appears to have had as its object simply the securing of cheap-
er transportation.6 Illinois first initiated legislation to regulate rail-
roads. In 1870 a clause was incorporated into the state constitution,
authorizing enactment of such laws, and in 1871 an act was passed
which prescribed maximum rates, prohibited discrimination and
established a railroad and warehouse commisison with power to pre-
scribe schedules of reasonable maximum rates. Similar legislation
was adopted shortly thereafter by Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Wiscon-
sin, and Missouri. 7  While this early state legislation dealt mainly
with establishment of maximum rates, discriminatory practices of rail-
roads were not being overlooked. 8
These attempts at regulation of railroad rates proved weak and
ineffective. In 1886 the Supreme Court handed down its decision in
Wabash Ry. Co. v. Illinois,9 in which it asserted the exclusive right
of federal control of interstate commerce by railroad, even as to that
portion within boundaries of a state and in absence of congressional
action in that field. This decision removed the majority of railroad
traffic from state control and accentuated the necessity for effective
regulation. It was in response to those conditions that federal
authority over the railroads was asserted by Congress through passage
4 Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877); Chi., Burl. & Q. R. R. v. Iowa, 94 U.S.
155 (1877); Peik v. Chi. & N. W. Ry., 94 U.S. 164 (1877); Chi., M. & St. P. R. R.
v. Ackley, 94 U.S. 179 (1877); Winona & St. P. R. R. v. Blake, "94 U.S. 180
(1877); Stone v. Wisconsin, 94 U.S. 181 (1877).
5 2 HANEY, A CONGRESSIONAL HISTORY Op RAILWAYS 240; 1 SHARFMAN, THE
INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION* 14, 15.
6 The Granger Movement proper seems to date back to the Farmers' Anti-
Monopoly Convention held in Des Moines, Aug. 13, 1873, where it was resolved to
agitate for maximum-rate laws. 2 HANEY, op. cit. supra note 5, at 240.
7 There had also been consideration of rate regulation in Congress. As early
as 1869 a resolution had been introduced in the House of Representatives charg-
ing trunk lines with consolidation and monopoly resulting in exorbitant and un-
equal charges on agricultural products bound for the eastern seaboard. Alleging
that tariffs on the East Coast discriminated against the West, it was requested
that the power of Congress to regulate railroad rates be clarified. And, in 1874
the House had passed the McCrary Bill which forbade unreasonable charges and
provided for prescription of maximum rates by railroad commissioners. Id. at
243, 244, 255.
8 Three bills directed against discriminatory practices by railroads were
introduced in Congress in 1872 which were followed by bills in 1873, 1874, and
five bills in 1875. Complaints were also made against the practice of manipulat-
ing railroads to control the petroleum and anthracite coal industries which were
accompanied by discriminatory practices. Id. at 285, 287.
9 118 U.S. 557 (1886).
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of the original ICA in 1887.10 That Act was primarily directed at
elimination of excessive charges and discriminatory practices." The
emphasis, however, was on discrimination. 12
In the Cullom Report, 13 which formed the basis for subsequent
enactment of the ICA, there appears a clear explanation of the evils at
which the legislation was directed:
" . . The theory of the common law is that all who are situated
alike must be treated alike. Unjust discrimination is the chief
cause of complaint against the management of railroads in the
conduct of business, and gives rise to much of the pressure upon
Congress for regulative legislation. The railroad companies do
not recognize as they should the fact that they sustain a different
relation to the public from persons engaged in ordinary business
enterprise. Railroad companies are not disposed to regard them-
selves 'as holding a public office and bound to the public' as ex-
pressed in the ancient law. They do not deal with all citizens alike.
They discriminate between persons and places, and the States and
Congress are consequently called on to in some way enforce the
plain principles of the common law for the protection of the people
against the unlawful conduct of common carriers in carrying on
the commerce of the country."
The Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), in its First Annual
Report described the situation in the following words:
"Those who have controlled the railroads have not only made
rules for the government of their own corporate affairs, but very
largely also they have determined at pleasure what should be the
terms of their contract relations with others, and others have
acquiesced, though oftentimes unwillingly, because, they could not
with confidence affirm that the law would compel it, and a test of
the question would be difficult and expensive. The carriers of the
country were thus enabled to determine in great measure what
rule's should govern the transportation of persons and property;
rules which intimately concerned the commercial, industrial, and
social life of the people." 14
It seems clear that the original requirement that tariffs be pub-
lished and posted was aimed at the discriminatory practices of the
railroads. In the Cullom Report, the committee expressed the view
that one of "the chief purposes of any legislation for the regulation
of interstate commerce should be to secure the fullest publicity both
as to charges made by common carriers and as to the manner in which
their business is conducted"; and went on to say that reasonableness
and uniformity in rates could not be secured without publicity, "which
is the surest and most effective preyentive of unjust discrimination."' 15
10 See 1 SHARFMAN, op. cit. supra note 5, at 1-21.
11 See ICC v. B. & 0. R. R., 145 U.S. 263 (1892); 2 HUTCHINsON, LAW OF
CARRIERS §527 (3d ed., 1906).
12 2 HANEY, op. cit. supra note 5, at 291.
13 Sen. Rep. No. 46, 49th Cong., 1st Sess. 40 (1886). This was a select com-
mittee appointed to investigate and report upon the subject of regulation of
transportation of freight and passengers between the several states by railroad
and water routes. Senator Cullom subsequently introduced S. 1532 on Feb. 16,
1886, which was ultimately enacted as the original ICA in 1887.
14 1 Annual Rep. of ICC 4 (1887).
15 Sen. Rep. No. 46, 49th Cong., 1st Sess. 198 (1886).
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It was pointed out by the committee that, while it was customary for
the railroads to print tariffs for guidance of their agents and informa-
tion to the public, they were subject to change as circumstances de-
manded. The light of publicity upon published tariffs was believed
to be the most effective deterrent to discrimination.1 6
This theory was embodied in the ICA, and the importance in the
scheme of regulation was attested in the following language:
"The ehief object of the act to regulate commerce is the preven-
tion of discrimination. Carriers being engaged in a public employ-
ment must serve all members of the public on equal terms. This
was the doctrine of the common law. It has been explicitly stated
and strengthened by successive acts to regulate commerce. The
requirement of the act that all rates should be published is perhaps
the chief feature of the scheme provided for the effective outlawing
of all discrimination. If this portion is not strictly enforced, the
entire basis of effective regulation will be lost. Secret rates will
inevitably become discriminatory rates. Whenever discriminatory
rates or practices are made public, a thousand forces of self-inter-
est and of public policy will be set at work to reduce them to fair-
ness and equality. The failure of any carrier to properly file and
publish its rates is quite as serious a violation of the act to regu-
late commerce as a failure to observe such rates after they have
been properly filed and published." 17
To be sure, experience under the ICA soon demonstrated that a
mere requirement that tariffs be published was not a cure-all. Such
a provision had to be buttressed with an adequate system of penalties
and with effective administrative control over carrier rates and prac-
tices.' 8  But its usefulness in combating discrimination remained un-
16Id. at 198-208 (general discussion of the importance of publicity). See
also 1 SHARFMAN, op. cit. supra note 5, at 21, 22, 42, 43.
17 U.S. v. Illinois Terminal R. R., 168 Fed. 546, 549 (S. D. Ill. 1909). See
also U.S. v. Chi. & A. Ry., 148 Fed. 646, 648 (N. D. Ill. 1906); 2 WYMAN, PUBLIC
SERVICE CORPORATIONS 1140-1 (1911).
18 From the beginning, Section 6 of the ICA contained requirements that car-
riers publish and post schedules of rates and all classifications, rules and regula-
tions which in any wise affected such rates, and elsewhere, a positive duty was
imposed upon carriers to maintain just and reasonable rates, and departures
from published rates were prohibited, with provision made for civil liability for
violations of the ICA, as well as criminal penalties for unjust discrimination.
However, the legislation proved ineffective due to denial of the authority of the
ICC to prescribe rates for the future in ICC v. Cincinnati, N. 0. & T. P. Ry., 167
U.S. 479 (1897), difficulty encountered by the ICC in obtaining effective enforce-
ment of its orders and reluctance of courts to impose criminal sanctions. The
force of the tariff was considerably enhanced by amendments to the ICA effected
by the Elkins Act of 1903 (32 Stat. 847) which imposed greatly increased penal-
ties in the nature of fines for failure to publish tariffs and for departures there-
from, which were made applicable to the carrier corp 6ration whereas previously
they applied only to the carrier's agent responsible for the discrimination. The
most significant amendatory legislation increasing effectiveness of tariffs resulted
from the Hepburn Act of 1906 (34 Stat. 584), which, in addition to strengthening
the sanctions against rebates by restoring the imprisonment penalty and subject-
ing the shipper to penalties for accepting rebates, granted the ICC authority,
after a hearing upon a complaint, to prescribe maximum rates and regulations orpractices for the future. Furthermore, the requirement was added that tariffs befiled with the ICC. The ICC's control over tariffs was further amplified by
amendments included in the Mann-Elkins Act in 1910 (36 Stat. 539), which
granted the ICC authority to suspend proposed changes in rates, to prescribe
tariff rates and rules for the future on its own initiative with specific inclusion of
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questioned. It survived many amendments which the ICA underwent,
and became an accepted and recognized part of the pattern of regula-
tion - a pattern which has been widely copied in other state and
federal statutes, including the Civil Aeronautics Act.
PROVISIONS oF THE CIVIL AERONAUTICS ACT
Students of public regulation will find that tariff-filing and rate
provisions of the Act fall into a generally familiar pattern. 19 How-
ever, since the questions to be considered are essentially problems of
statutory construction, we should examine the language of the relevant
provisions.
The Act first requires filing of tariffs. Section 403 (a) 20 provides,
in part:
"Every air carrier and every foreign air carrier shall file with
the Board, and print, and keep open to public inspection, tariffs
showing all rates, fares, and charges for air transportation be-
tween points served by it, and between points served by it and
points served by any other air carrier or foreign air carrier when
through service and through rates shall have been established, and
showing to the extent required. by regulations of the Board, all
classifications, rules, regulations, practices, and services in connec-
tion with such air transportation. Tariffs shall be filed, posted,
and published in such form and manner, and shall contain such
information, as the Board shall. by regulation prescribe; and the
Board is empowered to reject any tariff so filed which is not con-
sistent with this section and such regulations. Any tariff so re-
jected shall be void."'21
Strict observance of its filed tariffs is then enjoined upon the carrier.
"No air carrier or foreign air carrier shall charge or demand
or collect or receive a greater or less or different compensation for
air transportation, or for any service in connection therewith, than
the rates, fares, and charges specified in its currently effective
tariffs; and no air carrier or foreign air carrier shall, in any
manner or by any device, directly or indirectly, or through any
agent or broker, or otherwise, refund or remit any portion of the
rates, fares, or charges so specified, or extend to any person any
privileges or. facilities, with respect to matters required by the
Board to be specified in such tariffs, except those specified
therein." 22
Departure from the tariff is made a criminal offense.23
tariff rules within the power. And, under amendments included in the Transpor-
tation Act of 1920 (41 Stat. 456), the ICC's power over tariffs was extended to
include prescription of specific or minimum rates and to adjust intrastate rates
when they were found to result in an undue discrimination against interstate
commerce.
19 Other than those applicable to rates for the transportation of mail.20 52 Stat. 992, 49 USCA §483(a) (Supp. 1947).
21 The CAB has, pursuant to the authority granted by this section, promul-
gated regulations governing the form and content of tariffs to be filed by carriers,
and has required that tariffs contain rules and regulations "which in any way
affect the rates named in the tariff, or the service under such rates." Economic
Regulations, §224.1, particularly paragraphs A-3, A-4, and E-7. 14 Code Fed.
Regs. §224.1 (Cum. Supp.).22 Sec. 403(b); 52 Stat. 992, 49 USCA §483(b) (Supp. 1947).
23 Sec. 902(a) and (d); 52 Stat. 1015, 49 USCA §622(a) and (d) (Supp.
1947).
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Tariffs may be changed only after notice.
"No change shall be made in any rate, fare, or charge, or any
classification, rule, regulation, or practice affecting such rate, fare,
or charge, or the value of the service thereunder, specified in any
effective tariff of any air carrier or foreign air carrier, except
after thirty days' notice of the proposed change filed, posted, and
published in accordance with subsection (h) of this section. Such
notice shall plainly state the change proposed to be made and the
time such change Will take effect. The Board may in the public
interest, by regulation or otherwise, allow such change upon notice
less than that herein specified .... -24
In order to insure that the tariffs themselves will provide for fair
and equal treatment to all comers, a positive duty is imposed upon
carriers "to establish, observe, and enforce just and reasonable in-
dividual joint rates, fares, and charges, and just and reasonable classifi-
cations, rules, regulations, and practices relating to . . . air transporta-
tion", 25 and discrimination resulting from application of tariff provi-
sions is specifically prohibited.
"No air carrier or foreign air carrier shall make, give, or cause
any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to any particu-
lar person, port, locality, or description of traffic in air transporta-
tion in any respect whatsoever or subject any particular person,
port, locality, or description of traffic in air transportation to any
unjust discrimination or any undue or unreasonable prejudice or
disadvantage in any respect whatsoever. ' '26
However, sole reliance is not placed upon the carriers. The CAB
is given authority to suspend a tariff provision before it can go into
effect if it has reason to believe that the provision departs from
requirements of the Act. Section 1002 (g) 27 provides:
"Whenever any air carrier shall file with the Board a tariff
stating a new individual or joint (between air carriers) rate, fare,
or charge for interstate or overseas air transportation or any
classification, rule, regulation, or practice affecting such rate, fare,
or charge, or the value of the service thereunder, the Board
is empowered, upon complaint or upon its own initiative, at once,
and, if it so orders, without answer or other formal pleading by the
air carrier, but upon reasonable notice, to enter upon a hearing
concerning the lawfulness of such rate, fare, or charge, or such
classification, rule, regulation, or practice; and pending such
hearing and the decision thereon, the Board, by filing with such
tariff, and delivering to the air carrier affected thereby, a state-
ment in writing of its reasons for such suspension, may suspend
the operation of such tariff and defer the use of such rate, fare,
or charge, or such classification, rule, regulation, or practice, for
a period of ninety days, and, if the proceeding has not been con-
cluded and a final order made within such period, the Board may,
from time to time, extend the period of suspension, but not'for a
longer period in the aggregate than one hundred and eighty days
24Sec. 403(c); 52 Stat. 993, 49 USCA §483(c) (Supp. 1947).
25 Sec. 404(a); 52 Stat. 993, 49 USCA §484(a) (Supp. 1947).
26 Sec. 404(b); 52 Stat. 993, 49 USCA §484(b) (Supp. 1947).
2752 Stat. 1019, 49 USCA §642(g) (Supp. 1947).
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beyond the time when such tariff would otherwise go into effect;
and, after hearing, whether completed before or after the rate,
fare, charge, classification, rule, regulation, or practice goes into
effect, the Board may make such order with reference thereto as
would be proper in a proceeding instituted after such rate, fare,
charge, classification, rule, regulation, or practice had become ef-
fective. If the proceeding has not been concluded and an order
made within the period of suspension, the proposed rate, fare,
charge, classification, rule, regulation, or practice shall go into
effect at the end of such period: Provided, That this subsection
shall not apply to any initial tariff filed by any air carrier."
Furthermore, even after a tariff provision has taken effect, the Board
is given ample authority to investigate and determine its lawfulness.
Sections 1002 (a) and (b) 28 authorize the Board to conduct investiga-
tions, either on complaint or on its own initiative, of any alleged or
suspected violation of the Act, and Section 1002 (d) 29 provides that:
"Whenever, after notice and hearing, upon complaint, or upon
its own initiative, the Board shall be of the opinion that any indi-
vidual or joint rate, fare, or charge demanded, charged, collected
or received by any air carrier for interstate or overseas air trans-
portation, or any classification, rule, regulation, or practice affect-
ing such rate, fare, or charge, or the value of the service there-
under, is or will be unjust or unreasonable, or unjustly discrimina-
tory, or unduly preferential, or unduly prejudicial, the Board shall
determine and prescribe the lawful rate, fare, or charge (or the
maximum or minimum, or the maximum and minimum thereof)
thereafter to be demanded, charged, collected, or received, or the
lawful classification, rule, regulation, or practice thereafter to be
made effective: Provided, That as to rates, fares, and charges for
overseas air transportation, the Board shall determine and pre-
scribe only a just and reasonable maximum or minimum or maxi-
mum and minimum rate, fare, or charge."
Special provision is also made for correction of discrimination in for-
eign air transportation.
"Whenever, after notice and hearing, upon complaint, or upon
its own initiative, the Board shall be of the opinion that any indi-
vidual or joint rate, fare, or charge demanded, charged, collected,
or received by any air carrier or foreign air carrier for foreign
air transportation, or any classification', rule, regulation, or prac-
tice affecting such rate, fare, or charge or the value of the service
thereunder, is or will be unjustly discriminatory, or unduly
preferential, or unduly prejudicial, the Board may alter the same
to the extent necessary to correct such discrimination, preference,
or prejudice and make an order that the air carrier or foreign
air carrier shall discontinue demanding, charging, collecting, or
receiving any such discriminatory, preferential, or prejudicial rate,
fare, or charge, or enforcing any such discriminatory, prefer-
ential, or prejudicial classification, rule, regulation, or practice. 3 0
Thus, a carrier is permitted initially to determine rates which it
. will charge and other terms and conditions upon which it will offer
2852 Stat. 1018, 49 USCA §642(a) and (b) (Supp. 1947).
2952 Stat. 1018, 49 USCA §642(d) (Supp. 1947).
30 Sec. 1002(f I; 52 Stat. 1019, 49 USCA §642(f) (Supp. 1947).
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its services to the public. Those rates and terms and conditions must,
however, be embodied in tariffs published and filed with the Board.
They must be just and reasonable and non-discriminatory, and they
must be strictly adhered to. Departure from any tariff provision sub-
jects the carrier to criminal penalties, and, in the event rates or terms
and conditions of the carrier's offer do not comply with standards
established by the Act, the CAB may either suspend offending pro-
visions before they take effect, or correct them later.
There is one other provision of the Act which accounts for much
of the confusion which has existed concerning the legal effect of the Act
on the relationship between carrier and passenger or shipper. Sec-
tion 110681 provides that "Nothing contained in this Act shall in any
way abridge or alter the remedies now existing at common law or by
statute, but the provisions of this Act are in addition to such remedies."
With this historical background and Provisions of the Act before
us let us now turn to some major questions which have arisen con-
cerning the effect of tariffs filed under the Act.
ARE TARIFF PROVISIONS FILED UNDER THE CIVIL AERONAUTICS ACT
CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE OF THE CONTRACT OF CARRIAGE?
Cases Under the Insterstate Commerce Act
As we have seen, a carrier subject to the Civil Aeronautics Act is
required to publish and file tariffs containing his rates and rules,3 2
which, taken together, constitute the terms of its offer to serve the
public. The Act expressly prohibits the carrier from deviating from
published terms; any departure is punishable as a criminal offense.
But nowhere does the Act say in so many words, that the other con-
tracting party - passenger or shipper - is similarly restricted. What,
then, is the effect of the Act upon the contractural relationship of
the parties? Is the tariff equally binding upon passenger or shipper?
Are they to be deprived of a special term of the contract, even though
the carrier committed a criminal offense by agreeing to it? Is the
requirement of the Act that the carrier adhere strictly to its tariff a
sort of statutory parol evidence rule?
One of the first indications of the effect of a filed tariff upon the
contract of carriage appeared in Gulf C. 8c S. F. Ry. v. Hefley &
Lewis.33 In that case furniture was shipped from St. Louis, Missouri,
to Texas consignees at the revised rate appearing in the filed tariff, but
delivery was refused at destination because the agent insisted on pay-
ment of a higher rate appearing in an unrevised tariff. A Texas statute
made the bill of lading binding on the parties and provided for re-
covery of damages for each day delivery of goods was refused after a
3152 Stat. 1027, 49 USCA §676 (Supp. 1947).
32 Hereafter, we shall use the word "rates" as shorthand for the statutory
"rates, fares, and charges," and the word "rules," for "classifications, rules, regu-
lations, practices, and services."
a3 158 U.S. 98 (1895).
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
tender of charges in the bill of lading. In reversing a recovery by the
shipper in the state court, the Supreme Court pointed out that under
Section 6 of the ICA, the carrier was required to file its tariff and was
subject to penalties for any departure therefrom. Therefore, the
Court reasoned, the Texas statute making the terms of the bill of
lading controlling was of no effect, and recovery could not be sustained.
With the exception of Van Patten v. Chicago, M. & St.'P. Ry.,3 in
which it was held that the filed 'tariff was the only standard to be con-
sidered by courts and juries in determining whether the rate charged
was unreasonable and that no recovery could be had unless the rate
exceeded that filed, there was no further consideration of the relation-
ship of filed tariffs to the contract of carriage until the penalties for
departure from the filed tariff and against rebates had been extended
by the Elkins Act and the Hepburn Act.8 5
As far as rates are concerned, courtsquickly concluded that the filed
tariff is conclusive evidence of the terms of the contract. Commenc-
ing with Texas & Pacific Ry. v. Mugg & Dryden3 6 a long line of cases
established the rule that the filed tariff controls the rate, and is equally
binding on both carrier and shipper or passenger. The courts fre-
quently referred to the filed tariff as being "impressed with the force
of law," but this was simply a short way of saying that the tariff em-
bodied terms and conditions upon which the carrier offered its services
to the public; that, since the carrier could not legally deviate from
those terms, the passenger or shipper was bound to accept them when
he used the carrier's services; and, therefore, that the tariff is, by
force of law, sole evidence of the terms of the contract of carriage.
The Mugg & Dryden case3 7 involved an action to recover addi-
tional charges which the shipper had been required to pay over quoted
rates. The rates paid were in accordance with the filed tariff. A recovery
by the shipper in a Texas court was reversed on the ground that the
tariff filed with the ICC established the rate to be charged, regardless
of an)y agreement between the parties as to a different rate.38
The same principle was applied to passenger tariffs in Louisville
& Nashville R. R. v. Maxwell.3 9 A passenger purchased a round-trip
ticket, but the agent mistakenly quoted a fare lower than that ap-
plicable under the filed tariff. The carrier was denied recovery for
the additional fare "in a state couri:. On appeal, the Supreme Court
held that the carrier was entitled to recover the additional fare, since
the filed tariff fixed the only rate that could be charged and there
could be no departure from the filed rate even in the case of a mistake
3481 Fed. 545 (W. D. Iowa 1897).
3532 Stat. 847 (1903), 49 USCA §41 (1940); 34 Stat. 587 (1906), 49 USCA
§41 (1940).
36 202 U.S. 242 (1906).
37 Ibid.
38 The Hefley & Lewis case was cited in support of this position. 158 U.S. 98
(1895).
39 237 U.S. 94 (1915).
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made in good faith by the carrier and passenger. The Court said: 40
"Under the interstate commerce act, the rate of the carrier duly
filed is the only lawful charge. Deviation from it is not permitted
upon any pretext. Shippers and travelers are charged with notice
of it, and they as well as the carrier must abide by it, unless it is
found by the Commission to be unreasonable. Ignorance or mis-
quotation of rates is not an excuse for paying or charging either
less or more than the rate filed. This rule is undeniably strict,
and it obviously may work hardship in some cases, but it embodies
the policy which has been adopted by Congress in the regulation
of interstate commerce in order to prevent unjust discrimination."
The rule has been followed in numerous cases. 41
While tariffs filed under Part I of the ICA have been clearly
recognized as conclusive evidence of the rate provisions of the contract
of carriage, tariff rules have not always been accorded the same treat-
ment. Section 6 required filing of rules as well as rates, but for some
time after passage of the ICA, courts were inclined to treat tariff rules
as contractual terms only if agreed to by the parties and subject to
common law principles the same as before the advent of the regulatory
legislation.4 2
Judge v. Northern Pac. Ry. 43 exemplifies the early attitude of
courts toward tariff rules and indicates the ease with which the rules
could be circumvented. A theatrical performer traveled with a chim-
panzee which was ,placed in the regular baggage car since there was
no room in the special baggage car. Through the negligence of the
railroad's agents in placing the animal next to a steam radiator, it
was killed; but the railroad disclaimed liability under a filed tariff
provision which prohibited the transportation of the animal in the
regular baggage car. The court held that while the contract of
carriage was in contravention of the filed tariff provision and therefore
40 Ibid.
41 Loomis v. Lehigh Valley R. R., 240 U.S. 43 (1916) (denying recovery for
sums expended in converting cars when not provided for in tariff) ; Lehigh Valley
R.. R. v. U.S., 243 U.S. 444 (1917) (enjoining railroad's practice of allowing a
freight forwarder a commission based on the published tariff rate and a yearly
salary since it constituted a departure from the tariff) ; Pittsburgh, Cinn., etc.
By. v. Fink, 250 U.S. 577 (1919) (shipper required to pay published rate where
carrier made undercharge); New York C. & H. R. R. R. v. York & Whitney Co.,
256 U.S. 406 (1921) (recovery of balance of freight charges resulting from erro-
neous undercharge) ;Crancer v. Lowden, 315 U.S. 631 (1942) (shipper bound to
pay freight under classification in tariff as construed by ICC); Lowden v.
Simonds-Shields-Lonsdale Grain Co., 306 U.S. 516 (1939) (shipper could not dis-
claim liability for expense of installing grain doors where provision was made in
tariff for such expense). The ICC, in A. J. Poor Grain Co. v. Chicago, B. & Q.
Ry., 12 ICC 418 (1907), asserted this same concept of the filed tariff rate when it
was stated that the filed rate was the only lawful rate and no departure would be
permitted even where the agent of carrier was negligent in quoting the rates.
42 Cau v. Texas & P. By., 194 U.S. 427 (1904) (recognizing limitation
appearing in bill of lading only); Northern P. By. v. American Trading Co., 195
U.S. 439 (1904) (special undertaking to forward by certain steamship enforced
though inconsistent with bill of lading); Empire State Cattle Co. v. A. T. & S. F.
Ry., 210 U.S. 1 (1908) (deviation from route held justified apart from contract);
Missouri, K. & T. Ry. v. Patrick, 144 Fed. 632 (C. C. A. 8th 1906) (unsigned bill
of lading held no contract but only evidence of oral contract).
43 189 Fed. 1014 (Ore. 1911).
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void, nevertheless, the carrier, by accepting the property, became a
bailee and, in absence of a binding contract limiting its liability was
subject to the duties of a common or private carrier as the facts might
establish. The carrier's liability was said to arise out of the contract
of affreightment and duties and obligations imposed upon it by the
ICA.44
The first indication of judicial recognition of a filed tariff rule as
conclusive evidence of a term of the contract of carriage appeared in
two early cases in lower federal courts: Baltimore 8c 0. R. R. v. Ham-
burger 5 and Louisville & N. R. R. v. Dickerson.4 The Hamburger
case involved a suit in equity by the railroad to enjoin the defendant
from dealing in non-transferable passenger tickets. The injunction
was denied on the ground that, under Section 6 of the ICA, the rail-
road was required to file tariff provisions affecting rates charged or
value of the services rendered, and since the non-transferability pro-
vision was not included in the filed tariff, it was void. The court had
this to say: 47
"Whatever may be said of stop-over and such like advantages,
the sale and transfer of the ticket is not only a privilege, but a
right which directly enters into and affects the value of the ticket;
and hence, if either the right is to be denied or the privilege
abridged, under the plain language of the act in question, it must
be shown in the published tariff and schedule of the company.
The requirement in this respect is quite as positive as the one pro-
viding for publication of schedules showing such rates and charges,
and prohibiting deviation therefrom."
In the Dickerson case the railroad received a stripment as initial
carrier for transportation over its own line and lines of other carriers
under a joint through rate established and filed with the ICC. The
tariff made no provision for diversion of the shipment. The bill of
lading, however, provided that the shipper would bear any increased
costs in case of a change of routing because of necessity. The shipment
was rerouted because of the refusal[ of a connecting carrier to accept
the shipment and the shipper paid the additional charges. Subse-
quently, the shipper obtained a reparations order from the ICC, 48
awarding him the amount of the additional charges. The railroad
refused to pay and the shipper sued.. In holding that the shipper was
entitled to recover, since any special contract in the bill of lading at
variance with the filed tariff was void, the court made this comment: 49
"It seems clear that the regulation in question immediately
affected the rates for shipment between the points indicated. It
44 The Supreme Court had issued earlier a dictum that where goods were
transported under a contract at variance with published tariff rates, the contract
was void, but that the contract of affreighment was not void and the carrier
would be liable for its negligence. See Merchants Cotton Press & S. Co. v. Ins.
Co. of North America, 151 U.S. 368 (1894).
45 155 Fed. 849 (E. D. Va. 1907).
46 191 Fed. 705 (C. C. A. 6th 1911).
47 155 Fed. 849, 851 (E. D. Va. 1907).
48 Woodward & Dickerson v. L. N. R. R., 15 ICC 170 (1909).
49 191 Fed. 705, 710 (C. C. A. 6th 1911).
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directly increased the lawfully established and agreed compensa-
tion for the carriage. A regulation having such effect is required
to appear in defendant's tariff, and not so appearing is ineffective."
In reaching this conclusion, the court cited with approval the Ham-
burger case; but history of the two cases does not reveal further refer-
ence to their holdings.
Similarly, in Chicago R Alton R.'R. v. Kirby,50 the carrier and
shipper had entered into a special agreement for the expedition of a
shipment of horses. No extra charge was to be made for the special
service. The carrier failed to fulfill the agreement, and the shipper
recovered damages in a state court. In reversing the decision of the
state court, .the Supreme Court held that the shipper and carrier were
bound by the filed tariff which made no provision for such special
service, and that to recognize the agreement would give effect to an
undue preference. In its opinion the Court said: 5'
"The broad purpose of the commerce act was to compel the
establishment of reasonable rates and their uniform application.
That purpose would be defeated if sanction be given to a special
contract by which any such advantage is given to a particular ship-
per as that contemplated by the defendant in error. To guarantee
a particular train was to give an advantage or preference not open
to all, and not provided for in the published tariffs . .
The landmark in this field is Adams Express Co. v. Croninger. 2
A shipper delivered a small package containing a diamond ring to
the express company for transportation from Kentucky to Georgia.
Upon non-delivery of the package, he brought action in a Kentucky
court to recover full market value of the ring. Provisions in the
receipt and in tariffs of the express company filed with the ICC re-
quired the value of a shipment to be declared and limited liability for
loss to $50 if the value was not declared. Rates for shipments valued in
excess of $50 were graduated under the tariffs. A Kentucky statute
invalidated such limitations of liability, and the shipper recovered
full value of the ring. In. reversing the state court decision, the
Supreme Court concluded (1) that a contract for an interstate ship-
ment of goods, as evidenced by a receipt or bill of lading, was
governed by provisions of the ICA rather than by state law; (2) that
a provision in the receipt or bill of lading and filed tariff limiting
liability of the carrier to an agreed value, and fixing rates propor-
tionate to risk; was valid under general law as- applied in federal
courts; and (3) that the shipper was presumed to have knowledge of
filed tariff provisions and was therefore bound by the provision.5 3
50 225 U.S. 155 (1912).
51 Ibid. .
52 226 U.S. 491 (1913).
53 The decision in the Croninger case was rendered against a background of
diverse legislative and judicial treatment of the question of the right of interstate
common carriers to exempt themselves from all or part of their common-law lia-
bilities by tariff rules. The result was confusion and it was practically impossible
for a carrier to determine with any reasonable degree of certainty what his
responsibilities were in this respect. The Court apparently seized upon provi-
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Following the Croninger case, a number of decisions affirmed the
binding effect on carrier and shipper of filed tariff rules providing for
a limitation of the carrier's liability for property loss or damage in
interstate shipments, based upon released values with a choice of rates
proportionate to risks assumed.5 4 Boston & Maine R. R. v. Hooker,55
sions of the Carmack Amendment (present Section 20(11)) to the Hepburn Act
of 1906, enacted ten years earlier, as a basis for asserting federal control over
this question. The Carmack Amendment provided in substance that an interstate
common carrier should issue a receipt or bill of lading and would be liable to the
shipper for any loss or damage "caused by it" or by any connecting carrier; that
the carrier could not exempt itself from liability imposed by any contract, rule or
regulation; and that nothing in the Amendment would deprive a holder of a bill
of lading of any remedy or right of action under existing law.
The Court construed this language to mean that Congress had exercised its
conceded authority to regulate the interstate carrier's liability for property
offered for transportation, and its action superseded all policies of the states on
the same subject. In determining the liability imposed upon a carrier under the
Amendment, the Court reasoned that in view of the language "any loss, damage,
or injury to such property caused by it," it was not the intent to make the carrier
an absolute insurer, but only to impose liability for some breach of its common-
law duty in view of the qualifying phrase "caused by it." This was held to show
that Congress had evidenced an intent to regulate the liability of interstate car-
riers of property. Having made this determination, the Court found the tariff
provisions binding and valid since under the established rule of common law in
federal courts, a carrier could by agreement limit its liability for property loss to
an agreed value based upon a choice of rates proportionate to the amount of risk
assumed. In 1915 the ICC, in commenting indirectly on the result of the Cronin-
ger case, pointed out that the primary purpose of the Carmack Amendment was
to impose liability on the initial carrier for property received for interstate trans-
portation on account of any loss or damage to the property caused by it or any
other connecting carrier; and that it did not undertake to prescribe or limit terms
of the bill of lading, but rendered them void to the extent of any attempted limita-
tion of liability. Louisiana State Rice Milling Co. v. M. L. T. R. & S. S. Co., 34
ICC 511, 512.
54 Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry. v. Latta, 226 U.S. 519 (1913) ; Missouri, K. &
T. Ry. v. Harriman Bros., 227 U.S. 657 (1913); Kansas City S. Ry. v. Carl, 227
U.S. 639 (1913); Wells, Fargo & Co. v. Neiman-Marcus Co., 227 U.S. 469 (1913);
Great Northern Ry. v. O'Connor, 232 U.S. 508 (1914); Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v.
Robinson, 233 U.S. 173 (1914) ; Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Moore, 233 U.S. 182
(1914).
• The ICC's observation of the effect of the Croninger case was stated as fol-
lows:
"... Following the decision in that case there was a distinct change of policy
on the part of carriers, generally, in the adjustment of claims made upon
them for loss, damage, or injury to property. From a former policy of com-
promise, of making the best terms possible With the claimant, which was not
wholly disadvantageous to the claimant in many instances, and which, of
course, was often discriminatory in its operation, a disposition was developed
upon the part of many carriers to stand uncompromisingly upon their rights
as defined in the bill of lading....
"Prior to the decision in the Croninger case, supra, there had been much
conflict in the decisions, both of the federal and state courts, upon the ques-
tion of validity of conditions in bills of lading which limited or sought to limit
the amount of the carrier's liability for loss, damage, and injury to goods
transported. The proviso in the amendment had been construed by both fed-
eral and state courts to preserve to the shipper the remedies then existing un-
der state laws when the latter were more advantageous to him than the
remedy provided by federal law, and so the rules were interpreted. differently
according to the jurisdiction in which the case arose. The Croninger case
held that it was the purpose of Congress to assume jurisdiction in the fixing
of the carrier's liability upon interstate shipments, and thereafter such ques-
tions were generally construed in the light of the decision in that case, in
which it was held that a contract for transportation containing a stipulation
of value to which the carrier's liability was sought to be limited was valid
and not in violation of the provision of the act." In the Matter of Bills of
Lading, 52 ICC 671, 677, 683 (1919).
55 233 U.S. 97 (1914).
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extended the rule of the Croninger case to a tariff rule governing
liability for baggage. Previously, the cases dealing with rates based
upon released values had involved shipments of property moving
under express receipts or bills of lading specifying limitations of lia-
bility, although those cases had also accorded recognition to filed
tariff provisions. The Hooker case involved a limitation-of-liability
provision appearing only in the filed tariff, and it was conceded
that the passenger had no actual notice of the rule. The rule limited
liability for baggage loss or damage to $100 unless a greater value
was declared and excess charges paid based upon valuation. The
passenger declared no value and no inquiry was made as to value upon
acceptance. In an action in a Massachusetts court, the passenger
recovered actual value of the baggage on the theory that the ICA did
not change the common-law rule in Massachusetts that such limita-
tions were void unless brought to the attention of the passenger and
assented to by him. The Supreme Court reversed the decision, stat-
ing: "The effect of the filing gives the regulation as to baggage the
force of a contract determining 'baggage liability.' "56
As a result of these decisions, use of released value rates became
widespread. Congress in 1915 enacted the First Cummins Amend-
ment 57 which revised Section 20 (11) of the ICA (the Carmack Amend-
ment). In effect, this Amendment made the carriers liable for full
actual loss or damage to property notwithstanding any limitation of
liability, limitation of amount of recovery, or agreement as to value.
These provisions were modified by the Second Cummins Amendment 8
of 1916, which permitted released value limitations in connection
with baggage and, as authorized by the ICC, in connection with other
property, except livestock. Congress thus supplied standards for
determining validity of tariff iules establishing limitations of liability
.and filed under the ICA. The force of cases decided prior to these
amendments would not, however, seem to have been weakened; rather,
it is strengthened by legislative recognition of the conclusive effect
of such tariff provisions when filed pursuant to a regulatory statute.
Following the Cummins Amendments, there were additional re-
leased value cases asserting the binding effect of tariff rules establish-
ing limitations permitted by the legislation. 9 In N.Y.C. & H.R.RR
v. Beaham,6 ° action was brought to recover full value of baggage lost
by an interstate'.caiiici. Both the ticket and baggage check, as well
56 The Court went on to say that reasonableness of filed charges could only be
attacked in a proceeding before tfie ICC.
57 38 Stat. 1196' (1915), 49 USCA §20(11) (Supp. 1947).
5839 Stat. 441 (1916), 49 USCA §20(11) (Supp. 1947).
59 Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. v. Woodbury, 254 U.S. 357 (1920) (filed baggage
limitation held binding on both carrier and passenger) ; American Ry. Express v.
Lindenburg, 260 U.S. 584 (1923) (released value limitations in filed tariff rates
binding in shipment of trunks); American Ry. Express Co. v. Daniel, 269 U.S. 40
(1925) (shipper bound by provisions of filed tariff rates based upon valuation
even though he had no knowledge of rate provisions).60 242 U.S. 148 (1916).
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as the filed tariff, contained limitations of liability. Because of faulty
certification, the state court refused to admit the filed tariffs in evi-
dence, and full recovery was allowed. In reversing, the Supreme Court
stated: 61
"In order to determine the liability assumed for baggage it was
proper to consider applicable tariff schedules on file with the Inter-
state Commerce Commission; and the carrier had a Federal right
not only to a fair opportunity to put these in evidence, but also
that, when before the court, they should be given due considera-
tion."
The foregoing released value cases, while recognizing the binding
effect of filed tariff rules, are somewhat weakened by emphasis in the
opinions on the relation of rules to rates.6 2 This possible distinction
between rules closely related to rates and more general rules has not,
however, been regarded as significant in the cases dealing with other
types of rules. In Southern Ry. v. Prescott,63 an interstate shipment
of goods at reduced rates arrived at destination, and the consignee
paid the freight charges and removed part of the goods. The re-
mainder of the goods, which was retained by the carrier at the con-
signee's request and for his convenience, was destroyed by fire. In
consideration of the reduced rates, one of the rules contained in the
bill of lading and also included in the filed tariff was that property
held over 48 hours after notice of arrival would be subject to ware-
houseman's liability only. The consignee recovered in a state court
upon application of more liberal local law on the theory that the
interstate transportation had ended. In reversing this judgment,
the Supreme Court held that retention of goods was a "terminal
service" and therefore a part of interstate transportation within pur-
view of the ICA. Hence, the filed rules could not be departed from.
The Court made this comment: 1 4
"... It is also clear, that, with respect to the service governed by
the Federal statute, the parties were not at liberty to alter the
terms of the service as fixed by the filed regulations. This has
repeatedly been held with respect to rates [citations omitted] and
the established principle applies equally to any stipulation attempt-
ing to alter the provisions as fixed by the published rules relating
to any of the services within the purview of the act [citing Kirby
and Robinson cases supra]. This is the plain purpose of the stat-
ute in order to shut the door to all contrivances in violation of its
provisions against preferences and discriminations. No carrier
may extend 'any privilege or facilities,' save as these have been
duly specified. And as the terminal services incident to an inter-
state shipment are within the 'Federal Act, and the conditions of
liability while the goods are retained after notice of arrival are
61 Ibid.
62 See Kansas City S. Ry. v. Carl, 227 U.S. 639 (1913); Atchison, T. & S. F.
Ry. v. Robinson, 233 U.S. 173 (1914); Boston & Maine R. R. v. Hooker, 233 U.S.
97 (1914).
63240 U.S. 632 (1916).
64 Ibid.
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stipulated in the bill of lading under the filed regulations, the par-
ties cannot substitute therefor a special agreement."
Tariff rules providing limitations upon giving notice6" of loss,
damage, or injury have also been enforced by courts as binding upon
parties to the contract of carriage. In Northern Pac. Ry. v. Wall,66
the bill of lading, covering an interstate shipment of cattle, provided
that in case of damage notice had to be given to the agent of the
carrier at destination before the cattle were removed. After delivery
by a connecting carrier, a claim for damage was filed with the initial
carrier without complying with the notice requirement. Reversing
the recovery in the state court, the Supreme Court held that the filed
tariff rule was reasonable and binding on the parties, notwithstanding
that it was contrary to a Montana statute. Similarly, Erie R. R. v.
Stone6 7 involved a shipment of horses under a livestock contract. Filed
tariff rules conditioned liability upon giving notice of damage within
5 days from time of removal from the car. Reasonableness of the
rule was left to the jury in the state court, and recovery was allowed.
In reversing, the Supreme Court stated that the filed tariff rule was
binding on both parties, and it did not have to consider reasonableness
of the rule since it had been held reasonable in the Wall case.
In Gooch v. Oregon Short Line R. R..68 an action was brought for
damages for personal injuries sustained by the plaintiff while riding
on a drover's pass, under which the plaintiff agreed not to hold the
carrier liable for injuries unless notice of injury was given in writing
within 30 days after an accident. The notice requirement was con-
tained in the filed tariff. Plaintiff was injured but failed to give
required notice. The Court, in denying recovery although the car-
rier had actual notice, held the rule to be binding on the parties.
And in Georgia F. &c A. Ry. v. Blish Milling Co.6 9 there appears the
following dictum concerning a provision of the bill of lading requir-
ing notice of loss to be given within a specified time:7 0
"But the parties could not waive the terms of the contract un-
der which the shipment was made pursuant to the Federal Act; nor
could the carrier by its conduct give the shipper the right to ignore
these terms which were applicable to that conduct, and hold the
carrier to a different responsibility from that fixed by the agree-
ment made under the published tariffs and regulations. A differ-
ent view would antagonize the plain policy of the act and open the
door to the very abuses at which the act was aimed."
A filed tariff rule requiring written notice of an order for cars
65 Northern Pac. Ry. v. Wall, 241 U.S. 87 (1916); Erie R. R. v. Stone, 244
U.S. 332 (1917); Gooch v. Oregon Short Line R. R., 258 U.S. 22 (1922); see
Georgia, F. & A. Ry. v. Blish Milling Co., 241 U.S. 190 (1916). Minimum limita-
tions upon the filing of claims are now contained in Sec. 20(11) of the ICA, as





70 Georgia, F. & A. Ry. v. Blish Milling Co., 241 U.S. 190 (1916).
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was considered in Davis v. Henderson.71 The shipper brought an
action in a state court for damages for the carrier's failure to furnish
cars upon oral request and recovered. In reversing, the Supreme
Court said: 72
"There is no claim that the rule requiring written notice was
void. The contention is that the rule was waived. It could not be.
The transportation performed was that of a common carrier under
published tariffs. The rule was a part of the tariff."
Earlier, reference was made to the case of Judge v. Northern Pac.
Ry.,73 as illustrating the early tendency of the courts to disregard the
controlling effect of tariff rules. American Ry. Exp. Co. v. American
Trust Co.,7 4 involving a situation similar to that in the Judge case,
illustrates later acceptance of the principle that tariff rules are con-
clusive evidence of the terms of the contract of carriage. The plaintiff,
a banking house, had over a period of years engaged the services of the
express company in making shipments of money and other valuables.
The express company had filed a tariff providing that "Packages con-
taining money, bonds, or other securities will be received for transpor-
tation only when delivered at the Express Company's office by shippers."
The company collected a shipment from the plaintiff in the express
company's armored truck at the bank's premises. This conformed to
the company's practice over a period of years. En route to the com-
pany's office, the money was stolen from the truck and the bank sued
for its value. The express company contended that any contract
resulting from its practice in violation of the tariff rule was void and
no liability could be predicated thereon. The district court 75 held
that the contract in violation of the tariff rule was void and unen-
forceable but allowed recovery on the ground that the company,
by accepting the money for transportation, assumed the liability of
a common carrier. The court cited with approval the Judge case
and dictum in Merchant's Cotton-Press k Storage Co. v. Ins. Co. of
North America.76 The Circuit Court of Appeals, holding that the
tariff rule was binding upon the parties and could not be waived, re-
versed the district court. The court had this to say:77
"But if, the evidence showed that both appellant's agent and the
bank understood that the legal possession of the money passed to
the carrier at the bank, and if we further assume that a receipt
was given therefor by appellant's driver at the bank door, these
facts would not, under the decisions, affect appellant's liability.
For the published tariff may not be avoided, enlarged, or varied by
the shipper and the carrier through express or implied contract.
7u266 U.S. 92 (1924). Similarly, a special contract to provide cars at special
time is preference contrary to requirement that tariff be adhered to. Davis v.
Cornwell, 264 U.S. 560 (1924).
72 Ibid.
73 189 Fed. 1014 (Ore. 1911).
7447 F. 2d 16 (C. C. A. 7th 1931), cert denied, 284 U.S. 629 (1931).
75 American Trust Co. v. American Ry. Exp. Co., 42 F. 2d 272 (N. D. Ind.
1930).76151 U.S. 368 (1894).
747 F. 2d 16, 18 (N. D. Ind. 1930).
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The decisions are clear and explicit. Such tariffs, at least those
which are factors in determining the carrier's charges, have the
force and effect of statutes . . ."
Two cases involving tariffs of telegraph companies also have an
important bearing on this question. In W. U. Tel. Co. v. Esteve Bros.
& Co.,78 the telegraph company delivered an unrepeated cable to
Esteve Bros., directing the sale of 2,000 bales of cotton. It should
have read "200 bales." As a result of the error, Esteve Bros. suffered
a loss and sued to recover the amount. Although not required to do
so by the ICA at that time, the telegraph company had filed with the
ICC its tariff containing a provision that the "company shall not be
liable for mistakes ... in transmission . . . of any unrepeated message,
beyond the amount of that portion of the tolls which shall accrue to
it." The sender did not know that the condition existed. Under
Section 1 of the ICA, messages could be classified into "day, night,
repeated, unrepeated, letter, commercial, press, government and such
other'classes as are just and reasonable and different rates (might)
... be charged for the different classes of messages." Full damages
were recovered in the lower court. The Supreme Court reversed,
reducing recovery to the charge ($4.65) paid for transmission of the
message in accordance with the tariff rule. The Court stated the
question to be "whether since the amendment of June 18, 1910, to
the ICA to Regulate Commerce, the sender is, without assent in fact,
bound as a matter of law by the provision limiting liability because it
is a part of the lawfully established rate." In answering this question
in the affirmative, the Court proceeded on the theory that the rate,
of which the limitation of liability was an inherent part, was lawfully
established in accordance with the ICA, and, therefore, the company
was prohibited by Section 3 from granting anyone an undue preference
or advantage over the public generally. The Court was careful to
point out that the fact that the rates and rules were filed was im-
material, since the result flows, not from the filing, but from the
requirements of uniformity and equality. The Court said: 79
"The Act of 1910 introduced a new principle into the legal rela-
tions of the telegraph companies with their patrons which domi-
nated and modified the principles previously governing them. Before
the act the companies had a common-law liability from which they
might or might not extricate themselves, according to views of pol-
icy prevailing in the several states. Thereafter, for all messages
sent in interstate or foreign commerce, the outstanding considera-
tion became that of uniformity and equality of rates. Uniformity
demanded that the rate represent the whole duty and the whole lia-
bility of the company. It could not be varied by agreement; still
less could it be varied by lack of agreement. The rate became, not,
as before, a matter of contract, by which legal liability could be
modified, but as a matter of law, by which uniform liability was
imposed. Assent to the terms of the rate was rendered immaterial,
because, when the rate is used, dissent is without effect . .
78 256 U.S. 566 (1921).
79 Ibid.
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In W. U. Tel. Co. v. Priester,s0 the Alabama court had disregarded
a limitation of liability.included in the company's filed tariff on the
theory that the company had been guilty of gross negligence. In revers-
ing, the Supreme Court said: 8 '
" . . The established rates for unrepeated messages thus became
the lawful rates and the attendant limitation of liability became
the lawful condition upon which messages might be sent ... What
had previously been a matter of common law liability, with such
contractual restrictions as the states might permit, then became
the subject of Federal legislation to secure reasonble and just rates
for all without undue preference or advantage to any. Since that
end is attainable only by adherence to the approved rate, based
upon authorized classification, that rate 'represents the whole duty
and the whole liability of the company..."
The ICC, in response to a request to waive the four-month limita-
tion on presentation of claims by the shipper contained in tariffs, gave
recognition to the controlling effect of the filed tariff rule when it
stated that it had no authority to disregard the tariff rule. In re Bills
of Lading82 it made the following comment:
"... When it becomes apparent to carriers that they cannot, ought
not, or will not enforce the provisions contained in their established
tariffs, whether in regard to matters of the kind here involved,
demurrage, reconsignment, or other like practices, as well as to
rates, they should change the tariffs in the manner prescribed by
law so that their practices may be in conformity thereto ....
While, as we have seen, later cases arising under Part I of the ICA
have generally recognized that terms of a contract of carriage are to be
determined solely by reference to the filed tariffs,8 3 the rule has not re-
80 276 U.S. 252 (.1928).
81 Ibid.
82 29 ICC 417, 419 (1914).
85 The state courts in the various jurisdictions in cases arising under the ICA
have also, in general, held the filed tariff solely determinative of the terms of the
contract of carriage. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Stannard, 162 Pac. 1176 (Kan.,
1917); Am. Ry. Exp. Co. v. Mohawk Dairy Co., 144 N. E. 721 (Mass., 1924);
Penna. R. R. v. Marcelletti, 240 N. W. 4 (Mich., 1932); Minn., St. P.&S. St. M.
Ry. v. Reeves Coal Co., 181 N. W. 335 (Minn., 1921); Foster Lbr. Co. v. Atchison,
T. & S. F. Ry., 194 S. W. 281 (Mo., 1917); Wall v. Northern P. Ry., 161 Pac. 511
(Mont., 1916); Dolan Fruit Co. v. Davis, 196 N. W. 168 (Neb., 1923); Penna.
R. R. v. Titus, 109 N. E. 857 (N. Y., 1915); Cent. R. R. of N. J. v. Mauser, 88 Atl.
791 (Pa., 1913); Pacific Fruit & Produce Co. v. Northern Pac. Ry., 186 Pac. 852
(Wash., 1920); Notes, 49 L. R. A. (N. S.) 92, 83 A. L. R. 245. Similar treatment
has been accorded tariffs filed under the MCA. Artic Roofings, Inc. v. Travers, 32
A. 2d 559 (Del., 1943); Jackson & Perkins Co. v. Mushroom Transp. Co., Inc., 41
A. 2d 635 (Pa., 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 733, 90 L. Ed. 437 (1945). And, gen-
erally, the same result has been reached with respect to intrastate tariffs filed
pursuant to state regulatory statutes. Emerson v. Central of Ga. Ry., 72 So. 120
(Ala., 1916); Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. R. R. v. Alexandria Paper Co., 124 N. E.
402 (Ind., 1919); Jackson & Crawford v. Chi., B. & Q. Ry., 238 N. W. 911 (Iowa,
1931); Cummings Sand & Gravel Co. v. Minn. & St. L. R. R., 166 N. W. 354
(Iowa, 1918); Mollohan v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 154 Pac. 248 (Kan., 1916); C.
& 0. Ry. v. Maysville Brick Co., 116 S. W. 1183 (Ky., 1909) ; Mellon v. Stockton &
Lampkin, 35 S. W. 2d 612 (Mo., 1931); Chi. & N. W. Ry. v. Queenan, 167 N. W.
410 (Neb., 1918); Haurigan v. Chi. & N. W. Ry., 117 N. W. 100 (Neb., 1908);
Appalachian Electric Power Co. v. Virginian Ry., 29 S. E. 2d 471 (W. Va., 1944) ;
Note, 83 A. L. R. 245, 261. Contra: Mason v. Maine C. R. R., 110 Atl. 425 (Me.,
1920); Ferris v. Minn. & St. L. Ry., 173 N. W. 178 (Minn., 1919); Wall-A-Hee v.
Northern P. Ry., 41 P. 2d 786 (Wash., 1935).
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ceived unanimous judicial approval and application. In Pacific S. S.
Co. v. Cackette, 4 the plaintiff purchased and signed a ticket, sold sub-
ject to all conditions of the lawfully published tariff. The tariff, filed
with the California Ry. Board, U.S. Shipping Board and the ICC, con-
tained a rule that all claims for loss or damage should be presented in
writing within 10 days of landing. The plaintiff was assaulted by an
employee of defendant and brought an action for damages 10 months
later without giving the required notice. On appeal from a judgment
allowing recovery, the only question was whether the cause of action
was barred under the tariff rule. The court affirmed, basing its deci-
sion on the ground that the ICA contained no provision relating to
rights of action against carriers for assault or negligence, and that no-
tice of such claims has no perceptible relation to the charges for trans-
portation. The court recognized that the passenger was chargeable
with notice of the tariff, which became a part of the contract of trans-
portation [citing the Harriman and Hooker cases], but distinguished
the cases supporting the rule on the ground that in those cases limita-
tions were required to be filed in the tariffs. It reasoned that a passenger
or shipper was not chargeable with notice of any rule not contemplated
or required by the ICA.85
The Supreme Court in Boston 8c M. R. Co. v. Piper,86 in a decision
which is difficult to explain, departed from its general acceptance of the
rule. That case involved an action for damages resulting from delay in
a cattle shipment. The cattle were shipped at reduced rates under a
bill of lading filed with the tariffs. The bill of lading contained a pro-
vision that in case of unusual delay caused by carrier's negligence,
recovery would be limited to actual cost of feed and water with an op-
tion of a higher recovery upon the payment of higher rates. The
Court held that this was not a valid limitation on the amount of recov-
ery, but an attempt to exonerate the carrier from liability for its negli-
gence by a contract which left practically no recovery for damages and
was therefore void. The Court stated that: 87 "The legal conditions
and limitations in the carrier's bill of lading are binding until changed
by that body.. .; but not so of conditions and limitations which are, as
is this one, illegal, and consequently void." This instance of a court
disregarding the binding effect of the tariff provision under its own
conception of "illegality" would appear to be an exception to the gen-
eral rule.
The doctrine developed under Part I of the ICA has also been ap-
plied to tariffs under the Communications Act of 1934.88 Ambassador,
Inc. v. U.S.,9 was an appeal from a decree enjoining defendant hotels
from charging guests more than the toll charges of the Telephone Com-
848 F. 2d 259 (C. C. A. 9th 1925), cert. denied, 269 U.S. 586 (1926).
85 Cf. Gooch v. Oregon Short Line R. R., 258 U.S. 22 (1922).
86246 U.S. 439 (1918).
87 Ibid.
8848 Stat. 1064, 47 USCA §151 (Supp. 1947).
89 325 U.S. 317 (1945).
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pany in connection with interstate or foreign telephone calls. The
Telephone Company had filed a tariff with the Federal Communica-
tions Commission (FCC) which provided: "Message toll telephone
service is furnished to hotels, apartment houses and clubs upon the
condition that use of the service by guests, tenants, members, or others
shall not be made subject to any charge by any hotel, apartment house
or club in addition to the message toll charges of the Telephone Com-
pany as set forth in this tariff." The tariff had been filed pursuant to
an order of the FCC requiring the Telephone Company either to file
tariffs covering such charges, or to issue tariff regulation specifying con-
ditions under which such service would be furnished to hotels. The
Court affirmed the injunction .on the ground that the Communications
Act authorized filing of regulations governing the service, and, since
the tariff rule in question clearly affected the service, it was binding on
subscribers.
Decision Under the Civil Aeronautics Act
In the one reported case in which the question has been squarely
presented whether a tariff filed under the Civil Aeronautics Act is con-
clusive as to the terms of contract, the court reached a result consistent
with that developed under earlier regulatory statutes. In Jones v.
Northwest Airlines, Inc.,90 the plaintiff had purchased a round-trip
ticket from Seattle to Washington, D. C. He explained to the ticket
agent that he had a limited time in which to make the trip, and was
told that he could probably do it all right. The ticket bore the legend,
"Sold subject to tariff regulations." The plaintiff's flight was cancelled
en route because of weather, and he was offered the next available res-
ervation. His demand for a seat on the next plane having been re-
fused, he returned to Seattle without completing the trip. In his action
for breach of contract, he alleged that the contract of carriage was made
on the basis of the time element involved and that he was, therefore,
entitled to a seat on the next plane after his flight had been cancelled.
The applicable tariff on file with the CAB provided that the carrier
could cancel any flight at any time it deemed such action advisable or
necessary, and that the carrier would not be responsible for its failure
to arrive or depart on schedule. In affirming a decision by the trial
court that there had been no breach of contract, the Supreme Court of
Washington pointed out that the plaintiff purchased the ticket subject
to the tariff provisions, and that the carrier was prohibited from depart-
ing from them by the Act.91
90 157 Pac. 2d 728 (Wash. 1945); commented on in Orr, The Law Affecting
Aviation Liability, 20 Temple L. Q. 64 (1946) :
"The significance of the above decision is that it is the first we have had
upholding the legality of the rules and regulations filed by all airlines with
the CAB and hence applying the great volume of law already decided in con-
nection with the filing of like tariffs by railroads and other surface carriers
with the ICC. This includes the limitation of liability on checked baggage
and other property-a subject of increasing interest as air travel increases."
91 By way of dictum, the court added that had the provisions been attacked as
unreasonable, it would not have had jurisdiction, since that was a question to be
passed upon by the CAB in the first instance.
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While there have been occasional deviations from the rule as devel-
oped under earlier regulatory acts, it seems clear, both on principle and
authority, that a tariff filed under the Act is conclusive evidence of
terms of the contract of carriage. No other conclusion would be con-
sistent either with the express provisions of the Act or with its objec-
tives.
A carrier subject to the Act is required to publish and file tariffs
containing its rates and rules. These, then, taken together, constitute
the terms of its offer to serve the public. The Act expressly prohibits
the carrier from deviating from those terms; departure is punishable as
a criminal offense. To be sure, the Act does not explicitly say that the
other party to the contract - the passenger or shipper - is similarly re-
stricted. But the restriction upon his freedom to contract follows as a
matter of course. If the carrier is legally free to agree only to terms
published in its tariff and no others, there can hardly be a "meeting of
the minds" on other contractual terms, even though the passenger or
shipper retains complete freedom. The tariff, then, contains the only
terms upon which the parties can legally agree. It contains the car-
rier's offer, which the passenger or shipper accepts when he uses the
carrier's service. It is the contract of carriage.
It might conceivably be argued that, in spite of the prohibition
against deviation from its tariff, the carrier retains legal capacity to en-
ter into a binding contract including terms not specified in its tariff,
and that the tariff, therefore, is not conclusive e'idence of the terms of
the contract. It is certainly true that a criminal statute does not destroy
capacity of the criminal to violate the statute. But whether the ration-
ale is lack of legal capacity to enter into a contract deviating from the
tariff, or whether we regard such a contract as unlawful and therefore
unenforceable, the fact remains that the purposes of the Act cannot be
achieved if effect is given to such a contract. It will be recalled that
the primary purpose of the tariff-filing requirement was to prevent dis-
crimination. To recognize as valid and enforceable a contract deviat-
ing from the tariff would defeat that objective of the Act. It would bc
giving effect to a discrimination. Only by refusing to recognize such a
contract as valid and by refusing to enforce it can the objectives of the
Act be achieved.
It seems clear, also, that whether either a tariff rate or a rule related
directly or remotely, or not at all, to the rate is involved, the result
must be the same. No sound basis for distinction exists. The degree
of discrimination might vary, but the fact of discrimination remains.
The principles involved apply equally in each case.
CAN PROVISIONS OF A TARIFF FILED UNDER THE CIVIL AERONAUTICS ACT
BE AVOIDED OR INVALIDATED RETROACTIVELY?
If, as we have concluded, the filed tariff is conclusive evidence of
terms of the contract of carriage, the question arises whether a passen-
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ger or shipper, having become a party to the contract, may avoid its
provisions on the ground that they are unlawful. May he, for example,
after receiving transportation, attack the tariff rate as unreasonable and
recover as damages the excess over the lawful rate? May he escape the
effect of a tariff rule limiting the carrier's liability on the ground that it
is invalid? In the case of ordinary contracts, of course, a party can ob-
tain relief from provisions which are illegal or otherwise contrary to
public policy 2 Is this principle applicable to a contract of carriage
embodied in a tariff filed pursuant to the Act?
Essentially, the question is whether particular remedies are avail-
able to enforce a statutory duty of the carrier. The Act, as we have seen,
imposes an affirmative duty on carriers to publish lawful tariff rates and
rules, i. e., rates and rules which are "just and reasonable" 93 and which
do not result in "any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage"
or in "any unjust discrimination or any undue or unreasonable preju-
dice or disadvantage." 94 To insure performance of this duty, the Act
provides an elaborate system of safeguards and remedies. The CAB
may, through the exercise of its suspension powers, prevent an unlaw-
ful rate or rule from taking effectY5 Even after the unlawful provision
has become effective, the Board may take corrective action and require
the carrier to substitute a lawful provision.96 The carrier may be sub-
ject to criminal penalties for willful disregard of its statutory duty.97
Our problem is to determine whether or not, in addition to these reme-
'dies, the Act permits a passenger or shipper to attack the validity of a
tariff provision in order to establish a common-law right of action
against the carrier or deprive the carrier of a defense based on the
terms of the tariff. Was this remedy provided as additional insurance
against breaches of the carriers' statutory duty?
While the problem is one which might be attacked from several
different quarters, perhaps the most direct approach is to inquire
whether the CAB has power to pass upon lawfulness of a filed tariff
provision retroactively. If not, can the courts exercise such a power?
Obviously, if no judicial or quasi-judicial power exists to declare a
tariff provision invalid retroactively, the provision is immune from
such an attack. On the other hand, if the power exists, presumably it
can be exercised in appropriate cases. Let us examine first the powers
of the CAB.
Retroactive Power in Administrative Agencies
Since the CAB is a creature of statute, its powers are derived solely
from statute. Hence we must look to provisions of the Act to deter-
mine whether power to declare tariff provisions unlawful retroactively
92 Williston, Contracts, §1628 et seq. (Rev. Ed.).
93 Sec. 404(a) ; 52 Stat. 993, 49 USCA§484(a) (Supp. 1947).
94 See. 404(b).
9 5 Sec. 1002(g).9 6 Sec. 1002 (d).9 7 See. 902(a) and (d).
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has been conferred upon the Board. If such a power has not been ex-
pressly granted by, or cannot be reasonably implied from, the Act, then
no such power exists.
Nowhere in the Act is there an express grant of power to the Board
to invalidate tariff provisions retroactively. The only power to change
tariff provisions expressly conferred on the Board is to be exercised
prospectively. 'If the Board is of the opinion that a tariff provision "is
or will be" unlawful, it is to determine and prescribe the lawful rate
"thereafter" to be charged or the lawful rule "thereafter" to be made
effective.98 The finding that a tariff provision "is or will be" unlawful
looks to the present and future. The prescription of a lawful rate or
rule "thereafter" to become effective looks only to the future. The
lawfulness of the rate or rule at some time in the past is not presented
as a subject either for determination by the Board or for remedial ac-
tion.
Absent any express grant of authority to the Board to determine the
lawfulness of tariff provisions retroactively, can such a power be im-
plied from provisions of the Act? The express grant of a limited
power is persuasive evidence that Congress did not intend to confer a
broader or unlimited power. Precision in statutory drafting cannot be
regarded as unintentional. Hence, the express grant of .a power to
invalidate tariff provisions prospectively not only militates strongly
against implying a power to invalidate them retroactively, but, on the
contrary, also suggests that the power was deliberately withheld.
This conclusion finds potent support in a comparison of the Act
and Part I of the ICA, which had been passed approximatefy fifty years
previously and which, in many respects, served as a model for the later
Act. It is highly significant that at the time the Act was adopted, Part I
of the ICA, relating to rail carriers, made specific provision for civil lia-
bility for damages sustained by anyone as a consequence of a violation
of any provision of that Part.99 The person claiming damages might
either complain to the ICC or bring suit in a district court of the
United States; 100 and the ICC was expressly granted authority to make
an award of reparations.10 From its inception, the ICC had been ex-
pressly granted reparation powers, and the Act had been amended
9 8 Sec. 1002 (d).
99 Sec. 8; 24 Stat. 382 (1887), 49 USCA §8 (Supp. 1947).
100 Sec. 9; 24 Stat. 382 (1887), 49 USCA §9 (Supp. 1947).
101 Sec. 16; 34 Stat. 590 (1906), 49 USCA §16 (Supp. 1947). Originally,
reparation orders of the ICC were enforceable only in equity, and the ICC as-
sumed the position that it was precluded from considering the question of assess-
ment of damages since no jury trial was afforded. Council v. Western & Atl.
R. R., 1 ICC 339 (1887); Heck & Petree v. E. Tenn., Va. & Ga. R. R., 1 ICC 495
(1888) ; Riddle, Dean & Co. v. N. Y., L. E. & W. R. R., 1 ICC 594 (1888). This
defect was cured by an amendment of March 2, 1889 (25 Stat. 859), providing a
summary proceeding for enforcement of the ICC's orders in federal courts; but
the ICC continued to assume the attitude that the assessment of aamages was
peculiarly suitable for jury trial until forced to abandon its position in the face of
decisions in federal courts that if the complainant elected to proceed before the
ICC and received no award of damages, he could not subsequently pursue his rem-
edy at law. See 5 ANNUAL REP. OF ICC 10 (1891); Macloon v. Chi. & N. Ry., 5
ICC 84 (1892).
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from time to time to increase the effectiveness of that remedy. Surely,
when Congress enacted the Civil Aeronautics Act it was fully cognizant
of the existence of the reparation powers of the ICC, and knew that the
ICC, in exercising those powers, had been passing upon the validity of
tariff provisions retroactively for the prior half-century. Under those
circumstances, Congress' failure to follow the example of Part I of the
ICA on such an important point implies a deliberate departure, and a
decision to rely upon other sanctions and remedies to insure perform-
ance of the carriers' statutory duties.
If omission of reparation powers from the Act were an isolated in-
stance, contrary to a uniform regulatory formula prescribed for other
types of carriers, it might conceivably be argued that the omission was
an oversight, and that the power of the CAB to invalidate tariff provi-
sions retroactively should be implied, so as to give effect to a well-estab-
lished Congressional pattern. But that is not the case. When Congress
enacted the Motor Carrier Act (MCA) 102 in 1935, it omitted any pro-
vision imposing liability for civil damages for violations of the Act and
made no express grant of reparation powers to the ICC. Yet, five years
later, when Part III 103 (relating to water carriers) was added to the
ICA, Congress reverted to the pattern of Part I and provided civil lia-
bility for damages resulting from violations of that Part and expressly
granted reparation powers to the ICC. 0 4 But, only two years later
when Part IV 105 was added to regulate freight forwarders, no mention
was made of reparation authority. Similarly, in the field of ship-
ping,10 6 packers and stockyards, 0 7 and communications, 0 s the regula-
tory statutes expressly include reparation authority; but with respect
to the regulation of natural gas, 10 9 no reparation power was expressly
granted. These variations in the regulatory pattern established for
the different types of utilities can hardly be explained as the result
of oversight or accident. On the contrary, they constitute indisputable
evidence of deliberate inclusion in some cases and exclusion in others.
The conclusion seems clear. Congress was presented with a choice
between including or excluding a grant of reparations power in the
Act. It had granted the power to the ICC in the case of rail carriers,
but withheld it in the case of motor carriers. It had exercised a
similar election in the case of other regulatory statutes. It elected
not to grant such powers to the CAB, but, instead, granted the
limited power to modify tariff provisions prospectively. The most
reasonable, if not the only reasonable, inference is that no power to
10249 Stat. 543, 49 USCA §301 (Supp. 1947), now Part II of the ICA.
103 54 Stat. 929, 49 USCA §901 (Supp. 1947).
104 Sec. 308; 54 Stat. 940, 49 USCA §908 (Supp. 1947).
105 56 Stat. 284 (1942), 49 USCA §1001 (Supp. 1947).
106 SHIPPING ACT OF 1916, 39 Stat. 736 (1916), 46 USCA §821 (1940).
107 PACKERS AND STOCKYARDS ACT, 1921, 42 Stat. 165 (1921), 7 USCA §308
(1940).
108 COMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1934, 48 Stat. 1072 (1934), 47 USCA §206
(1940).
109 NATURAL GAS ACT, 52 Stat. 821 (1938), 15 USCA §717 (1940).
EFFECT OF TARIFF PROVISIONS
invalidate them retroactively was conferred on the Boara.11°
While the foregoing conclusion has not been judicially confirmed,
it finds support in the construction placed by the courts on statutes
similar to the Act. In Hope Natural Gas Company v. Federal Power
Commission,"' the Federal Power Commission (FPC), conceding the
lack of any reparation power under the Natural Gas Act, asserted
its authority in aid of state regulation to make a finding as to past
lawfulness of rates.112 The Natural Gas Act also conferred on the
FPC express power to modify rates prospectively, 113 but conferred
no power to invalidate rates retroactively. The Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed the FPC's order on the ground that, in the absence
of an express grant of such authority, none existed. The Supreme
Court, while not passing upon the question of the FPC's power,
reversed on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction to review
the FPC's order under judicial review provisions of the Natural
Gas Act 1 4 until some further action had been taken under the order.
Although the order had been mistakenly reviewed, the opinion of
the Circuit Court of Appeals is not without value: 15
"The fundamental difference between quasi-legislative and
quasi-judicial power is that the one is concerned primarily with
prescribing regulations for the future, the other with determining
rights in the light of what has occurred in the past .... The Nat-
ural Gas Act shows clearly that it was the intention of Congress" to
give the Commission quasi-legislative power, i. e., regulatory power
as to future rates; but there is no indication of any intention to
clothe it with judicial or quasi-judicial powers with respect to past
charges or practices, such as was vested in the Interstate Com-
merce Commission by section 9 of the Interstate Commerce Act.
As the Commission itself says, it was not given authority to fix
rates for the past or to award reparations on account of past rates.
If it was not given the power to fix past rates, or award repara-
tions based upon their unreasonableness, it certainly was given no
power to do the same thing indirectly by making findings of fact as
to past rates to be given effect in rate proceedings before state
commissions. No intention on the part of Congress to vest any
11o Recourse to legislative history of the MCA and the Civil Aeronautics Act
fails to disclose any information as to reasons for the different treatment when
the acts were passed. The ICC has recently recommended that motor carriers,
some water carriers (not presently liable), and freight forwarders be made liable
for damage resulting from violations of the act, and subject to reparation orders.
See ANNUAL REP. OF ICC, 118 (1945) ; 122 (1946) ; 148 (1947). In supporting a
pending bill in Congress which would accomplish that recommendation, the Legis-
lative Committee of the ICC in commenting on the omission of reparation power
from Part II of the ICA pointed out that at the time of its enactment it was be-
lieved that conditions in motor transportation were not stabilized and the subjec-
tion of motor carriers to liability for damages should be deferred until problems
under the new regulations had been solved. After twelve years of experience un-
der the regulations it is now believed that conditions justify addition of the repa-
ration remedy for the benefit of the shipper. Hearings before Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H. R. 2324 and H. R. 2295, 80th Cong., 1st
Sess. 5 (1947).
M11 134 F. 2d 287 (C. C. A. 4th 1943).
112 52 Stat. 821, 15 USCA §717 (Supp. 1947).
113 Sec. 5(a); 52 Stat. 823, 15 USCA §717(d) (Supp. 1947).
114 Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944).
15 Hope Natural Gas Co. v. F. P. C., 134 F. 2d 287, 309 (C. C. A. 4th 1943).
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such unusual power in a commission ought to be indulged unless
conferred in the plainest terms; and not only is it not plainly given
here, but such power cannot be spelled out of the statutes on any
theory of interpretation with which we are familiar." (Citations
omitted.)
A number of state courts construing state statutes have reached
a similar conclusion. The regulatory scheme of the ICA has been
widely followed in the statutes regulating intrastate carriers. How-
ever, many state acts, like the Civil Aeronautics Act, expressly grant
authority to state boards or commissions to prescribe tariff provisions
or to change them prospectively, but are silent as to any power to
invalidate provisions retroactively. These statutes have generally
been construed as conferring no jurisdiction on regulatory boards or
commissions to invalidate tariff provisions retroactively." 6
The question was presented under the New York statute in
Murphy v. New York C. R.R., n7 involving an action to recover track
storage charges paid under a filed tariff. The claim was based on a
resolution of the State Commission that the charges were unreasonable.
The statute contained an express grant of power to change tariff
provisions prospectively, but contained no reparation authority. In
reversing a recovery in the lower court, it was pointed out that the
statute conferred no jurisdiction on the Commission to pass upon
rates retroactively:11 8
"The action at bar asserts the doctrine that the Public Service
Commission is empowered to determine that a rate or charge for
intrastate transportation, duly scheduled and filed with it, has
been, through a period of years during which it has been filed and
paid, and is, unreasonable and unjust, that the payor is entitled to
recover from the carrier the excess fixed by the Commission beyond
the reasonable charge, and that the determination of the Commis-
sion is prima facie proof in the courts of the state of the facts
determined. We cannot discern in the statute such legislative in-
tent."
In Great Western Portland Cement Co. v. Public Service Com-
mission,"9 a complaint charging that railroad rates applicable in the
past were unreasonable and requesting a determination by the
Commission of rates that would have been reasonable had been filed
with the state Commission. Upon refusal of the Commission to make
the determination for lack of jurisdiction, the complainant obtained
a writ of mandamus to compel such action. On appeal, the man-
damus order was reversed. The Court held that the statute neither
expressly nor by fair interpretation conferred power on the Commis-
sion to make findings as to reasonableness of rates previously charged.
A similar result was reached under the Virginia Statute.120  An
116 Note, 97 A. L. R. 406 (1935).
117 122 N. E. 700 (N. Y., 1919).
118 Id. at 701.
119 127 Pac. 881 (Kan. 1926).
1 2
oMathieson Alkali Works v. N. & W. Ry., 137 S. E. 608 (Va., 1927).
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action in assumpsit was brought to recover overcharges. The rates
charged had been in accordance with a tariff filed after a general
order of the Commission granting increases. Upon a later finding
that the rates were unreasonable at certain destination points, the
Commission had corrected them; and the question presented was
whether this finding had retroactive effect in the absence of an
express grant of reparation powers. The Court held that the rates
were conclusively presumed to be reasonable as long as they re-
mained in effect, and that the Commission had no power to invalidate
them retroactively. In reaching that conclusion the Court in part
relied on the fact that, unlike the ICA, the Virginia statute contained
no express grant of reparation powers. The Court made the follow-
ing observation:12
1
"The omission to specifically confer the power on the State Cor-
poration Commission to declare a legally established rate unreason-
able retroactively and to award reparation is significant, in view of
the fact that the Federal Act was before the constitutional conven-
tion and the legislature when the Constitution was adopted and the
corporation statutes were enacted, and many of its provisions were
adopted. An intentional omission, under the circumstances, seems
clear." 122
The Montana Court, in Montana Horse Products Co. v. Great
Northern Ry.123 and Sunburst Oil k Refining Co. v. Great Northern
Ry., 24 considered the power of the State Commission to pass upon
the reasonableness of rates previously prescribed or approved by it and
held that since there was no express grant of reparation powers in
the statute, rates prescribed by the Commission were presumed to be
reasonable as long as they remained in effect and could not be de-
clared unreasonable retroactively. 25 In the Sunburst case the Court
said: 126
"Since the finding by the commission as to the unreasonableness
of the rate because of the difference between the actual and the
estimated weights of the oil operated prospectively only, and the
only lawful tariff which could be exacted by the carrier was that
which was at the time prescribed in its published tariff as fixed by
the Commission, it is apparent that the plaintiff is not entitled to
damages by way of reparations. Common-law rights of the ship-
per are superseded by the statute.
"Under our statutes, so long as the rates established by the
121 Id. at 775.
122 When the question was later presented to the Virginia Court, it again re-
viewed the statute and found that, in view of provisions expressly granting the
ICC prospective powers to change tariff provisions and the absence of any grant
of reparation powers, no power to change tariff provisions retroactively could be
implied. Commonwealth ex rel. Appalachia v. Old Dominion Power Co., Inc., 34
S. E. 2d 364 (Va., 1945).
123 7 P. 2d 919 (Mont., 1932).
124 7 P. 2d 927 (Mont., 1932).
125 The holding was made applicable for the future, since the court felt com-
pelled to follow an earlier precedent reaching an opposite result. This aspect of
the case was affirmed in Great Northern Ry. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 287
U.S. 358, 77 L. Ed. 360 (1932), as not depriving the carrier of property without
due process.
126 7 P. 2d 927, 929 (Mont., 1932).
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Commission are in force, they are presumed to be reasonable, and
neither the commission nor the courts have power to retroactively
declare such established rates unreasonable and then permit the
recovery of damages to the extent of the overplus paid by a shipper
or an undercharge collected by the carrier."
In the Montana Horse Products case, the Court pointed out the
error of a former decision 127 in which it held that a court had no
jurisdiction to award damages based upon unreasonableness of rates
until the Commission had made such a finding, and that the Com-
mission's lack of authority to award reparations did not preclude its
making. a finding of unreasonableness which could serve as the basis
of a common-law action. The Court said that without reparation
authority, the Commission's jurisdiction did not include power to
determine validity of tariff rates retroactively, and, therefore, the
previous decision could not be reconciled with the statute.
These cases illustrate the position that has generally been adopted
in construing state statutes which expressly grant regulatory com-
missions power to prescribe or change tariff provisions prospectively,
but omit any reparation power a.1 2  No power on the part of the com-
mission to determine validity of tariff provisions retroactively has
been implied under such circumstances. On the contrary, the express
grant of a power to be exercised prospectively, coupled with omis-
sion of any authority to make retroactive determinations, has been
regarded as clear evidence that the latter authority was deliberately
withheld.
While, as we have seen, there is ample support, both in principle
and authority, for the conclusion that the CAB has no authority to
make retroactive determinations of the validity of tariff provisions
127 Doney v. Northern P. Ry., 199 Pac. 432 (Mont., 1921).
128 Miller Mill Co. v. L. & N. R. R., 92 So. 797 (Ala., 1922); Texas & P. Ry. v.
Railroad Comm. of La., 69 So. 837 (La., 1916); U.S. Steel Corp. v. Pa. R. R.,
P. U. R. 1920 E, 142 (Ohio P. U. C.); Toledo Sugar Co. v. Cinn. N. R. R., P. U. R.
1921 E, 737 (Ohio P. U. C.) ; Leroy Springs v. Duke Power Co., P. U. R. 1931 D, 9
(S. C. R. R. Comm.). The Texas statute, in the absence of an express reparation
power, has been construed as limiting the commission's jurisdiction to prospective
control over tariff rates, but jurisdiction is granted to courts to pass upon reason-
ableness of rates. See Houston Chamber of Commerce v. Railroad Comm. of
Texas, 19 S. W. 2d 583 (Tex. Civ. App., 1929); Missouri-Kansas & T. R. R. v.
Railroad Comm. of Texas, 3 S. W. 2d 488 (Tex. Civ. App., 1928).
In most of the cases construing state acts, courts in denying any implication
under the statutes of power in the commission to invalidate tariff provisions retro-
actively placed much emphasis on the fact that rates were commission-made as
distinguished from carrier-made rates under Part I of the ICA, which made them
legislative in nature. The appraisal of the distinction in a case which arose un-
der the New Mexico statute is interesting. Kemp Lbr. Co. v. A. T. & S. F. Ry., 9
P. 2d 387 (N. M., 1932). There an action was brought to recover overcharges
based on the difference between the rate as finally fixed by the SC and the rate
which had been established by the carrier within the maxima previously set by
the legislature and charged from the time of complaint. The contention was
made that a right of action survived since the rates were carrier-made under the
New Mexico law as distinguished from the scheme of commission-made rates in
other states. The court, however, refused to regard the distinction as significant,
since the carrier-initiated rates, if permitted to remain unchanged, became in
effect commission-made rates. Observing that the statute provided no reparation
power, the court stated that the commission's control over rates was solely legisla-
tive, to which the common law remedy must give way.
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filed with it in accordance with the Civil Aeronautics Act, the path
to that conclusion is not without obstacles. One obstacle was created
by a case invoking the so-called primary jurisdiction doctrine. In
that case involving the validity of a tariff provision filed under the
Act, the court held that the CAB had primary jurisdiction to deter-
mine such issues. Adler v. Chicago & Southern Airlines, Inc. 29 was
an action brought against an airline for damages allegedly resulting
from cancellation of a scheduled flight. On motion of the defendant,
the court dismissed the action on the ground that the practice of
cancelling flights was a "practice" within the meaning of the Act,
and that the court was without jurisdiction to grant relief until either
the CAB found that the practice complained of was unlawful or the
plaintiff had exhausted his remedies before the Board.130  The de-
cision is clearly at odds with the conclusion suggested above, for it
assumes that the Board has jurisdiction to pass upon lawfulness of
the practice retroactively. And it seems to assume also that the
plaintiff's remedies before the Board not necessarily would be limited
to a prospective change in the tariff rule covering the complained-of
practice. The case therefore requires further attention.
In reaching its conclusion that the primary jurisdiction doctrine
applied, the court in the Adler case relied upon the precedents estab-
lished under Part I of the ICA. The doctrine has its origin in Texas
8c Pacific Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co.l31 where it was held that
a shipper could not sue a rail carrier to obtain redress for being.
charged an unreasonable rate, prior to a determination by the ICC
that the rate was unreasonable. The doctrine was regarded as essen-
tial to preservation of the regulatory system created by Part I of the
ICA and to the effectuation of its purposes. Although the ICA itself
provided access to federal courts for a passenger or shipper who had
been injured by a carrier's breach of statutory duties, it was recog-
nized that uniformity of treatment-which was one of the major pur-
poses of the ICA-could never be achieved if validity of tariff rates
and rules was to be tested by divergent standards of different courts
129 41 F. Supp. 366 (E. D. Mo. 1941).
130 In a subsequent proceeding before the CAB the jurisdiction of the Board
*to pass upon lawfulness of the practice was not questioned. The complaint did
not allege any specific unlawful, unreasonable or improper practice, and it was
dismissed since, after investigation, the Board found no failure by the carrier to
comply with the provisions of the Act and that the practice was not unjust or
unreasonable. 4 CAB 113 (1943). In Sehwartzman v. United Air Lines, 6 FRD
517 (D. C. Neb. 1947), an action, similar to that in the Adler case, was brought to
recover damages for failure of the airline to transport the plaintiff, after pur-
chase of a ticket and reservation of space, and for return of the purchase price of
the ticket. A motion was made to dismiss on grounds that the CAB had primaryjurisdiction of the question and that the plaintiff had failed to exhaust his reme-
dies before the Board. The motion was denied, since at that stage of the plead-
ings no question had been presented which was within the statutory jurisdiction
of the Board, but without prejudice to a renewal of the motion if an issue within
the jurisdiction of the Board were later raised by the pleadings. The court dis-
agreed with the conclusion reached in the Adler case that the single act of cancel-
lation constituted a "practice" within the Act on basis of the facts reported in the
opinion in that case.
131 204 U.S. 426 (1907).
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and juries. Only by centralizing responsibility for making such de-
cisions could consistent results be expected and desired uniformity
achieved. The primary jurisdiction doctrine, therefore, was a pre-
requisite to proper administration of Part I of the ICA and attain-
ment of its major objectives. Consequently, the doctrine was con-
sistently applied' in cases involving validity of tariff rates 82 or
rules' 83 under Part I of the ICA.
It should be recalled that the primary jurisdiction doctrine had
its origin under a statute which expressly granted power to the ICC
to award reparations. As long as the doctrine is applied under
such a statute, there can be no question concerning the soundness
of the assumption of administrative jurisdiction underlying the doc-
trine. But when the doctrine is transplanted into a field where the
regulatory statute grants no such authority, the assumption under-
lying the doctrine falls-and the doctrine with it. An administrative
agency which has no jurisdiction to make retroactive determinations
of the validity of tariff provisions certainly cannot have primary
jurisdiction to do so; and courts, by blind invocation of the doctrine,
cannot confer jurisdiction which the statute withheld. Thus, if the
jurisdiction exists, it must be derived from the statute, not from a
doctrine of judicial self-limitation.
Examination of the opinion in the Adler case reveals that the
court relied upon precedents under Part I of the ICA and the Ship-
ping Act, in which the doctrine had been applied, and upon the
general similarity of regulatory patterns created by those Acts, on
the one hand, and the Civil Aeronautics Act, on the other. It neither
made any detailed examination (so far as the opinion indicates) of
provisions the Act, nor did it mention the significant differences
between Part I of the ICA and the Civil Aeronautics Act which have
been previously noted. Under those circumstances, it is difficult to
believe that the court, fully aware of the problem, construed the Civil
Aeronautics Act as conferring, by implication, authority on the CAB
to determine retroactively validity of the practice in issue. It seems
more likely that precedents under other Acts and the general similarity
of those Acts to the Civil Aeronautics Act were accepted by the court
uncritically, and that the assumption of adequate jurisdiction in the
Board was not questioned.
But whatever the explanation of the court's decision, it is believed
to be unsound. As already indicated, there are convincing reasons for
the conclusion that the Civil Aeronautics Act did not confer on the
CAB power to determine retroactively the validity of tariff provisions.
If such power exists, it must be implied in the Act, and any such
implication is defeated by considerations outlined above. Certainly,
182 Texas & P. Ry. v. Cisco Oil Mill, 204 U.S. 449 (1907); Southern Ry. V.
Tilt, 206 U.S. 428 (1907); Mitchell Coal & Coke Co. v. Penna. R. R., 230 U.S. 247(1913).
183 Morrisdale Coal Co. v. Penna. R. R., 230 U.S. 304 (1913); Midland Valley
R. R. v. Barkley, 276 U.S. 482 (1928).
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the reasoning of the Adler decision does not furnish a convincing
answer to those arguments. On the contrary, the opinion in the
Montana Horse Products case'34 seems to furnish a more than
adequate answer to the Adler decision.
A second obstacle to the conclusion that the CAB does not have
power to invalidate tariff provisions retroactively is the position which
the ICC has taken under the MCA. Although the pertinent provi-
sions of that Act closely parallel the provisions of the Civil Aero-
nautics Act, 135 the ICC has held that it has implied power to pass
upon lawfulness of rates involved in past transactions, even though
it does not have express authority to grant reparations.113 The leading
case'37 in which the Commission asserted its authority involved a
complaint against lawfulness of rates charged on past shipments of
potato chips. The Commission found the rates to be unreasonable
both for the past and the future. While admitting that it had no
power to grant reparations for past unlawful charges, the Commission
felt that its determination of unlawfulness could form the basis for
an action for damages in court. The Commission relied upon its
general powers under the MCA to enforce the Act,138 and more spe-
cifically upon its power, upon complaint or its own initiative, to in-
vestigate and determine whether a motor carrier has complied with
the provisions of the Act and to make necessary orders to obtain
compliance. 3 9 The Commission reasoned that since the duty of es-
tablishing just and reasonable rates was imposed on carriers, and
unjust and unreasonable charges were prohibited and made unlaw-
134 Montana Horse Products Co. v. Great Northern Ry., 7 P. 2d 919 (Mont.,
1932).
135 Sec. 204(a) (6); 52 Stat. 1237, 49 USCA §304 (a) (6) (Supp. 1947); Sec.
204(c) ; 54 Stat. 922, 49 USCA §304(c) (Supp. 1947) ; Sec. 216(a), (b), (d) and
(e); 49 Stat. 558 (1935), 52 Stat. 1240 (1938) 54 Stat. 924, 49 USCA §316(a),
(b), (d) and (e) (Supp. 1947); Sec. 217; 49 Stat. 560 (1935), 54 Stat. 925, 49
USCA §317 (Supp. 1947).
136 Statements of the conclusion of the commissions in this respect appear in
Barrows Porcelain Enamel Co. v. Cushman Motor Delivery Co., 11 MCC 365
(1939) ; Koppers Co. v. Langor Transport Corp., 12 MCC 741 (1938) ; Hill-Clarke
Machinery Co. v. Webber Cartage Line, Inc., 26 MCC 144 (1940); Dixie Merceriz-
ing Co. v. Motor Transport Co., 21 MCC 491 (1940); Kingan & Co. v. Olson
Transp. Co., 32 MCC 10 (1942); Hausman Steel Co. v. Seaboard Freight Lines,
Inc., 32 MCC 337 (1944).
1 Bell Potato Chip Co. v. Aberdeen Truck Line, 43 MCC 337 (1944). The
Commission has consistently cited the Potato Chip case as authority for its posi-
tion in this respect. Hill v. Penna. Truck Lines, Inc., 43 MCC 319 (1944) ; Schae-fer v. C. A. Conklin Truck Line, Inc., 43 MCC 333 (1944); Armour & Co. v. Bell,
44 MCC 35 (1944); Victory Granite Co. v. Central Truck Lines, Inc., 44 MCC 320
(1945); Freight Transportation Engineers, Inc. v. Great Central Transport
Corp., 46 MCC 46 (1945); Clark Thread Co. v. Atl. States Motor Lines, Inc., 46
MCC 49 (1945); Servus Rubber Co. v. Merchants Motor Freight, Inc., 46 MCC
777 (1947); Rhea Mfg. Co. v. Acme Fast Freight, Inc., 47 MCC 280 (1947);
Glenn L. Martin Co. v. W. T. Cowan, Inc., 47 MCC 303 (1945).
188 Sec. 204(a) (6); 52 Stat. 1237, 49 USCA §304(a)(6) (Supp. 1947).
139 Sec. 204(c) ; 54 Stat. 922, 49 USCA §304(c) (Supp. 1947).
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
ful, it had authority to issue an order declaring rates on past ship-
hents unlawful.1 40
The Commission's opinion on this point is, of course, entitled to
great respect, but it cannot be regarded as conclusive. It rests, neces-
sarily, on the premise that a passenger or shipper who has been in-
jured by a carrier's breach of statutory duty to establish lawful rates
and rules is entitled to maintain an action for damages against the
carrier. But, as we have seen, this premise has been specifically denied
by state courts construing analogous statutes. They have concluded
that the statutes created new rights and remedies which superseded
the common-law remedy of damages. If that remedy is unavailable,
the incentive for finding, in the general provisions of the Act, an im-
plication that the Commission has the power to make determinations
in aid of the remedy disappears and jurisdiction so implied becomes
a futility, under the reasoning of the Commission. Whether the
remedy is available-and hence the validity of .the Commission's
premise-is part of the second phase of our present inquiry.
RETROACTIVE POWER IN COURTS
Turning now to our second question-whether the courts have
jurisdiction to invalidate tariff provisions retroactively-we find our-
selves confronted at the outset with Section 1106 of the Civil Aero-
nautics Act:
"Nothing contained in this Act shall in any way abridge or al-
ter the remedies now existing at common law or by statute, but the
provisions of this Act are in addition to such remedies." 141
Although this purported reservation of common-law remedies is
comprehensive in terms, the courts have been unwilling to construe
such provisions to preserve rights which are inconsistent with the
purposes of the statute in which they appeared. The wording of sec-
tion 1106 is practically identical to that contained in the saving clause
of Part I of the IOA. 142 In Texas 8& Pacific Ry. v. Abilene Cotton
Oil Co.,143 discussed above, the Court recognized the existence of a
common-law right to the relief sought, which was apparently pre-
14o An interesting variation of the assertion of the ICC's conception of its
authority in this respect appears in United States Rubber Co. v. Associated
Transport, Inc. (Doe. No. MC-C-871, Feb. 16, 1948). The carrier determined that
rates charged on certain shipments were inapplicable and sought to collect the
additional charges under the applicable tariff. The complaint alleged that the
charges sought to be collected were unreasonable and requested the ICC to pre-
scribe reasonable rates for the future and authorize the carrier to waive collection
of outstanding undercharges. The carrier admitted that the charges were unrea-
sonable and was willing to waive them. The ICC not only concluded that rates on
past shipments were unreasonable, but also expressed the opinion that the carrier
could waive collection of undercharges on the basis of rates found to have been
reasonable. It reached this conclusion by interpreting the prohibition against
departures from the filed tariff in light of the provision making the charging of
unreasonable rates unlawful.
141 52 Stat. 1027, 49 USCA §676 (Supp. 1947).
142 Sec. 22; 24 Stat. 387 (1887), 49 USCA §22 (1940).
143 204 U.S. 426 (1907).
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served by the saving clause. But in refusing to enforce the right, the
Court said:' 44
"This clause, however, cannot in reason be construed as contin-
uing in shippers a common-law right, the continued existence of
which would be absolutely inconsistent with the provisions of the
act. In other words, the act cannot be held to destroy itself. The
clause is concerned alone with rights recognized in or duties im-
posed by the act, and the manifest purpose of the provision in ques-
tion was to make plain the intention that any specific remedy given
by the act should be regarded as cumulative, when other appropri-
ate common-law or statutory remedies existed for the redress of
the particular grievance or wrong dealt with in the act."
Again, in Robinson v. B. & 0. R.R., 145 a shipper sought to recover
damages based upon payment of allegedly discriminatory rates, with-
out prior resort to the ICC. The Court referred to the saving clause
in the following language:14 6
"Of course, the provision in §22, as also the provision in §9,
must be read in connection with other parts of the act, and be
interpreted with due regard to its manifest purpose; and, when
that is done, it is apparent that neither provision recognizes or im-
plies that an action for reparation, such as is here sought, may be
maintained in any court, Federal or State, in the absence of an
appropriate finding and order of the Commission."
When the Carmack Amendment 47 was added to the ICA, it also
contained a proviso purporting to preserve remedies which were
available under existing law. Nevertheless, the Court, in Adams
Express Company v. Croninger,148 rejected the contention that the
proviso preserved remedies provided under state law:
"But it has been argued that the nonexclusive character of this
regulation is manifested by the proviso of the section, and that
state legislation upon the same subject is not superseded, and that
the holder of any such bill of lading may resort to any right of ac-
tion against such a carrier, conferred by existing state law. This
view is untenable. It would result in the nullification of the regula-
tion of a national subject, and operate to maintain the confusion of
the diverse regulation which it was the purpose of Congress to put
an end to.
"What this court said of the 22d section of this act of 1887 in
the case of Texas & P. R. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co .... is appli-
cable to this contention. It was claimed that that section continued
in force all rights and remedies under the common law or other
statutes. But this court said of that contention what must be said
of the proviso in the 20th section, that it was evidently only in-
44 Ibid.
245 222 U.S. 506 (1912).
146 Ibid.
47 Sec. 20(11); 34 Stat. 595 (1906), 49 USCA §20(11) (1940). "... Pro-
vided further, That nothing in this section shall deprive any holder of such re-
ceipt or bill of lading of any remedy or right of action which he has under existing
law: . .. "
148226 U.S. 491 (1913).
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tended to continue in existence such other rights or remedies for
the redress of some specific wrong or injury, whether given by the
interstate commerce act, or by state statute, or common law, not
inconsistent with the rules and regulations prescribed by the provi-
sions of this act. Again, it was said of the same clause, in the
same case, that it could not in reason be construed as continuing in
a shipper a common-law right the existence of which would be
inconsistent with the provisions of the act. In other words, the act
cannot be said to destroy itself.
"To construe this proviso as preserving to the holder of any
such bill of lading any right or remedy which he may have had un-
der existing Federal law at the time of his action gives to it a more
rational interpretation than one which would preserve rights and
remedies under existing state laws, for the latter view would cause
the proviso to destroy the act itself. One illustration would be a
right to a remedy against a succeeding carrier, in preference to
proceeding -against the primary carrier, for a loss or damage
incurred upon the line of the former. The liability of such suc-
ceeding carrier in the route would be that imposed by this statute,
and for which the first carrier might have been made liable."
It seems clear, in the light of these decisions, that the provisions
of Section 1106 do not provide a ready and automatic answer to our
question. Common-law remedies were preserved only to the extent
that they are consistent with general purposes of the Act and the regu-
latory system created by it. Hence we must look to the rest of the
Act to determine the scope and effect of Section 1106. But before
doing that, it may be helpful to review the experience under other
regulatory statutes and the judicial reactions to the question.149
The treatment of the problem by state courts has varied under
different state regulatory acts. In general, however, where the stat-
utes provide for comprehensive supervision of tariff provisions by
the administrative agency and grant no express reparation authority,
the courts have concluded that the common-law rights of passengers
and shippers based upon unlawful tariff provisions have been super-
seded by statutory remedies. In some cases, emphasis is placed on
149 The opinion of the Court in Siwalk v. Pennsylvania-Central Airline8
Corp., 1 Avi 900 (Cir. Ct. Wayne Co., Mich. 1940), has received considerable
attention since it is one of the few judicial expressions touching upon the efficacy
of a tariff provision filed by air carriers. That case was an action for damages to
the plaintiff's baggage while she was a passenger on an intrastate trip. A bottle
of mouthwash which she carried in her traveling bag was broken as a result of
the negligence of the airline's employee. The airline had on file with the CAB a
tariff which provided, among other things, that "liquids" were unacceptable as
baggage. The plaintiff received a baggage claim check which had written on it
"subject to tariff rules and regulations.' The case was tried on stipulated facts,
and the Court held that the plaintiff was an intrastate passenger even though the
airline was of an intrastate and interstate character. Then, assuming that the
tariff filed pursuant to a federal act controlled, the Court construed the tariff pro-
vision as not prohibiting the inclusion of a small amount of mouthwash in the
passenger's baggage. The court pointed out that if the tariff were not applicable
to intrastate trips, the plaintiff would be entitled to recover under the stipulated
facts which, under Michigan law, amounted to a stipulation of negligence. While
the validity of the tariff provision was not at issue, some observers seem to feel
that had the Court felt constrained to rule that the mouthwash was excluded from
acceptable baggage under the rule, it would have held the rule to be invalid.
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the fact that tariff rates are established by the commissions themselves
and, therefore, can only be changed prospectively in accordance with
the statutes.150 In such cases, the rates are conclusively presumed to
be lawful 4s long as they remain in effect. In other cases, while relying
on the legislative nature of the tariff provisions because of the power
granted the commissions to prescribe rates, the courts have reached
the same conclusion with respect to tariff provisions initiated by the
carrier.151 Although, in some cases, a common-law right of action
has been held to survive notwithstanding the absence of a reparation
power in the regulatory act, 52 a majority of the cases support the
position that any common-law right of action, based on unlawfulness
of tariff provisions, must give way to remedies provided by the
statutes themselves. 153
A clear statement of the reasons for acceptance of this principle
is to be found in Purcell v. NeW York Central R.R.154 There a shipper,
after the State Commission had prescribed rates for the future, brought
,an action for damages and sought to use the Commission's determina-
tion as the basis for the charge that the rate paid in the past had been
excessive. The New York Act, significantly, granted the Commission
power only to modify tariffs prospectively. In concluding that all
common-law remedies had been superseded by the New York Act, the
Court stated: 155
"When the railroad filed its tariff schedules as required by sec-
tion 28 of the Public Service Law, these were the lawful charges to
be paid by the brick company for its shipments of brick. The ship-
per could not legally pay less, the railroad could not charge more or
less. These were the rates fixed according to the statute until mod-
ified as therein provided. A subsequent change, although delayed,
did not make the prior charges illegal or unreasonable. The stat-
ute creating the Public Service Commission and empowering it to
supervise rates and charges was intended to cover the whole sub-
ject of rates and supersede all common-law remedies. As long as
the charges enforced are those on file with the commission, they
are the only lawful charges which may be collected. No departure
from the filed rate is permitted.
"The Legislature has 'provided a means for the protection of
shippers against unreasonable rates. The action at law resulted in
150 Woodrich v. Northern Pac. Ry., 71 F. 2d 732 (C. C. A. 8th 1934); Mon-
tana Horse Products Co. v. Great Northern Ry., 7 P. 2d 919 (Mont., 1932); Sun-
burst Oil & Refining Co. v. Great Northern Ry., 7 P. 2d 927 (Mont., 1932):;
Mathieson Alkali Works, Inc. v. N. & W. Ry., 137 S. E. 608 (Va., 1927); see Gur-
ney Heater Mfg. Co. v. New York, N. H. & H. R. R., 162 N. E. 897 (Mass., 1928);
City of Boston v. Edison Elec. Illuminating Co.j 136 N. E. 113 (Mass., 1922).
151 Miller Mill Co. v. Louisville & N. R. R., 92 So. 797 (Ala., 1922); Young
Heading Co. v. Payne, 89 So. 782 (Miss., 1921). See statement by court in
Mathieson Alkali Works, Inc. v. N. & W. Ry., supra note 150, that no affirmative
duty was imposed on commission to determine reasonableness of all rates but that
it is contemplated that all rates are to be approved.
152 National Radiator Co. v. Penna. R. R., 143 Atl. 85 (N. J., 1928); see Son-
ken-Galamba Corp. v. Mo. Pac. R. R., 40 S. W. 2d 524 (Mo., 1931); Houston
Chamber of Commerce v. Railroad Comm. of Texas, 19 S. W. 2d 583 (Tex. Civ.
App., 1929).
153 Kemp Lumber Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 9 P. 2d 387 (N. M., 1932).
154 197 N. E. 182 (N. Y., 1935), cert. denied 296 U.S. 545 (1935).
155 Ibid.
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different rates for different shippers dependent upon the opinion of
juries as to what was reasonable. The statute makes the specified
rate as fixed uniform and lawful until changed by or with the per-
mission of the commission.
"We therefore hold that the remedy provided by our Public
Service Law for excessive rate charges is the only relief open to the
plaintiff under the circumstances here set forth . . . This question
was left open in the Murphy Case . . . We now decide it." 150
At an earlier stage of the proceedings in this same case,'1 57 it was
contended that survival of the common-law remedy under the statute
was supported by statements in opinions of the primary-jurisdiction
cases under the ICA. But the court distinguished those cases as
arising under an act which specifically provided a statutory liability
for damages: 158
"Plaintiff's argument for a statutory action finds support in
statements in the opinions in cases decided by the Supreme Court
of the United States [citing the Abilene and Robinson v. B. & 0.
R. R. Cases] made in reference to the federal act to regulate com-
merce, which does provide a statutory cause of action. A corres-
ponding right to bring an action is not contained in the state law.
There the rights of the shipper are protected by the power of the
Commission summarily to suspend a filed rate and fix a temporary
rate for a period which ordinarily would permit a full hearing and
final determination and the fixing of a permanent rate which, to the
Commission, seemed fair to both parties.
The primary jurisdiction cases under Part I of the ICA also recog-
nize that the purposes of the ICA would be defeated if courts were to
exercise the right to determine the validity of tariff provisions retro-
actively. The compelling reason for the pronouncement of that doc-
trine was the statutory objective of uniformity and the necessity of
avoiding the risk of divergent decisions by different courts and juries.
This is apparent in the opinion of the Court in Texas & Pac. Ry. v.
Abilene Cotton Oil Co. 59 in which the doctrine had its origin:
"When the general scope of the act is enlightened by the consid-
erations just stated it becomes manifest that there is not only a
relation, but an indissoluble duty, between the provision for the
156 See also Miller Mill Co. v. Louisville & N. R. R., 92 So. 797, 802 (Ala.,
1922): "Such schedules cannot be made unlawful for and during the period of
their approved operation by any subsequent retroactive finding and order of the
commission. Such a practice would be odious to the generally established notions
of justice, and would, moreover, be utterly subversive of the policy and utility of
any system of rate regulation; for no rate could be relied upon as stable, and
neither the carrier nor the shipper could ever be certain of the basis upon which
business was being conducted. . . ." Young Heading Co. v. Payne, 89 So. 782, 786
(Miss., 1921) : "If the contention on behalf of the appellant were sound, the whole
scheme and plan of the supervision statutes would be upset, because varying judg-
ments might be rendered by different shippers, even though each case was based
upon identically the same state of facts. Thus instead of having uniform and
fixed rates the result could and might be a different rate for every shipper who
chose to go into court in a suit against the carrier to test an alleged over-
charge .. "
157 Purcell v. New York C. R. R., 242 App. Div. 292, 275 N. Y. Supp. 70
(1934).
158 Id. at 73.
159 204 U.S. 426 (1907).
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establishment and maintenance of rates until corrected in accord-
ance with the statute and the prohibitions against preferences and
discrimination. This follows, because, unless the requirement of a
uniform standard of rates be complied with, it would result that
violations of the statute as to preferences and discrimination would
inevitably follow. This is clearly so, for if it be that the standard
of rates fixed in the mode provided by the statute could be treated
on the complaint of a shipper by a court and jury as unreasonable,
without reference to prior action by the Commission, finding the
established rate to be unreasonable, and ordering the carrier to de-
sist in the future from violating the act, it would come to pass that
a shipper might obtain relief upon the basis that the established
rate was unreasonable, in the opinion of a court and jury, and thus
such shipper would receive a preference or discrimination not en-
joyed by those against whom the schedule of rates was continued to
be enforced. This can only be met by the suggestion that the judg-
ment of a court, when based upon a complaint made by a shipper
without previous action by the Commission, would give rise to a
change of the schedule rate and thus cause the new rate resulting
from the action of the court to be applicable in future as to all.
This suggestion, however, is manifestly without merit, and only
serves to illustrate the absolute destruction of the act and the
remedial provisions which it created which would arise from a rec-
ognition of the right asserted. For if, without previous action by
the Commission, power might be exerted by courts and juries gen-
erally to determine the reasonableness of an established rate, it
would follow that, unless all courts reached an identical conclusion,
a uniform standard of rates in the future would be impossible, as
the standard would fluctuate and vary, dependent upon the diver-
gent conclusions reached as to reasonableness by the various courts
called upon to consider the subject as an original question. Indeed,
the recognition of such a right is wholly inconsistent with the
administrative power conferred upon the Commission, and with the
duty, which the statute casts upon that body, of seeing to it that
the statutory requirement as to uniformity and equality of rates is
observed. Equally obvious is it that the existence of such a power
in the courts, independent of prior action by the Commission,
would lead to favoritism, to the enforcement of one rate in one
jurisdiction and a different one in another, would destroy the pro-
hibitions against preferences and discrimination, and afford, more-
over, a ready means by which, through collusive proceedings, the
wrongs which the statute was intended to remedy could be success-
fully inflicted. Indeed, no reason can be perceived for the enact-
ment of the provision endowing the administrative tribunal which
the act created with power, on due proof, not only to award repara-
tion to a particular shipper, but to command the carrier to desist
from violation of the act in the future, thus compelling the altera-
tion of the old or the filing of a new schedule, conformably to the
action of the Commission, if the power was left in courts to grant
relief on complaint of any shipper, upon the theory that the estab-
lished rate could be disregarded and be treated as unreasonable,
without reference to previous action by the Commission in the
premises. This must be, because, if the power existed in both
courts and the Commission to originally hear complaints on this
subject, there might be a divergency between the action of the
Commission and the decision of a court. In other words, the estab-
lished schedule might be found reasonable by the Commission in
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the first instance and unreasonable by a court acting originally, and
thus a conflict would arise which would render the enforcement of
the act impossible."
It must be remembered that this doctrine was developed under
Part I of the ICA, which not only provided specifically for liability
on the part of carriers and made it enforceable in federal courts, but
also purported to preserve all common-law remedies. The doctrine
has been applied both. in cases involving lawfulness of tariff rates8 0
under Part I of the ICA, and in cases where tariff rules were an issue.1 1
Similarly, where an action for damages for alleged violation of
the antitrust laws was based on a conspiracy to fix rates in restraint
of trade, the Court's comment in approving a dismissal for want of
jurisdiction affords additional evidence of judicial reaction to exer-
cising a power to invalidate tariff provisions retroactively:
"Section 7 of the Anti-Trust Act gives a right of action to one
who has been injured in his business or property. Injury implies
violation of a legal right. The legal right of shipper as against
carrier in respect to a rate are measured by the published tariff.
Unless and until suspended or set aside, this rate is made, for all
purposes, the legal rate, as between carrier and shipper. The
rights, as defined by the tariff, cannot be varied or enlarged by
either contract or tort of the carrier ... This stringent rule pre-
vails, because otherwise the paramount purpose of Congress-pre-
vention of unjust discrimination-might be defeated. If a shipper
could recover under §7 of the Anti-Trust Act for damages resulting
from the exaction of a rate higher than that which would other-
wise have prevailed, the amount recovered might, like a rebate,
operate to give him a preference over his trade competitors. It is
no answer to say that each of these might bring a similar action
under §7. Uniform treatment would not result, even if all sued,
unless the highly improbable happened, and the several juries and
courts gave to each the same measure of relief ... ,,12
One point emerges from these cases with remarkable clarity. Ju-
dicial authority to invalidate tariff provisions retroactively cannot be
160 Texas & P. Ry. v. Cisco Oil Mill, 204 U.S. 449 (1907), action in state court
for excess charges over reasonable rates; Southern Ry. v. Tift, 206 U.S. 428
(1907), suit to restrain carrier from increasing rates suspended pending applica-
tion to ICC; Robinson v. B. & 0. R. R., 222 U.S. 506 (1912), determination of dis-
criminatory practices referred to ICC; Mitchell Coal & Coke Co. v. Penna. R. R.,
230 U.S. 247 (1913), determination of reasonableness of allowances (otherwise
rebates) referred to ICC; Director General v. Viscose Co., 254 U.S. 498 (1921),
reasonableness of tariff classification for ICC; Lewis-Simas-Jones Co. v. Southern
P. Co., 283 U.S. 654 (1931), reasonableness of rate; J. C. Famechon v. Northern
Pac. Ry., 23 F. 2d 307 (C. C. A. 8th 1927), whether filed rate included charge for
refrigerator cars; Atlantic C. L. R. R. v. Delaware & H. R. Corp., 86 F. 2d 721
(C. C. A. 2d 1936), reasonableness of carrier's rates or division of joint rates; El
Dorado Terminal Co. v. General American Tank Car Corp., 104 F. 2d 903
(C. C. A. 9th 1939), reasonableness of rates.
181 Morriadale Coal Co. v. Penna. R. R., 230 U.S. 304 (1913), car distribution
rule; Midland Valley R. R. v. Barkley, 276 U.S. 482 (1928), car distribution rule;
Northern Pac. Ry. v. Solum, 247 U.S. 477 (1918), routing practice; see B. & 0.
R. R. v. U.S., 215 U.S. 481 (1910) ; Great Northern Ry. v. O'Connor, 232 U.S. 508
(1914); Boston & Maine R. R. v. Hooker, 233 U.S. 97 (1914). See also U.S. v.
Pac. & A. R. & N. Co., 228 U.S. 87 (1913).
162 Keogh v. Chi. & N. W. Ry., 260 U.S. 156 (1922).
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exercised without destructive effects upon the statutory scheme of uni-
formity. And this is true whether or not the statute provides the
injured passenger or shipper a remedy in damages. Even though the
statute expressly affords that remedy, and expressly confers jurisdic-
tion on the courts to enforce it (as in the case of Part I of the ICA),
the courts will refrain from exercising jurisdiction until the determina-
tion of invalidity has been made by the administrative agency charged
with primary responsibility for administration of the statute. In no
other way can the right to damages be reconciled with the paramount
objective of uniform treatment for all. In the case of those statutes
which do not expressly reserve common-law rights or provide for civil
liability on the part of the carriers, the courts have, in many cases,
concluded that the preservation of such rights would be inconsistent
with the objective of uniformity and have construed the statute as
abolishing that type of remedy. Under both types of statutes, great
stress has been laid upon the statutory objective of uniformity and
non-discrimination.
CONCLUSION
There can be no question that the Civil Aeronautics Act, like
its predecessors, had as one of its major purposes prevention of dis-
crimination and assurance of uniform treatment for all passengers
and shippers similarly situated. In providing regulatory means to
achieve that end, Congress borrowed heavily from the experience
under Part I of the ICA. However, it omitted-and we must conclude
deliberately-provisions contained in Part I of the ICA which imposed
civil liability for violations of the ICA, and which authorized either
the ICC or the federal courts to enforce such liability. Moreover, the
powers of the CAB to determine .the validity of tariff provisions were
expressly made prospective. No intimation can be found in the Civil
Aeronautics Act that a passenger or shipper should be entitled to relief
from unlawful tariff provisions involved in past transactions, unless
it is contained in the general reservation of common-law rights con-
tained in Section 1106. As we have seen, however, that section must
be construed as preserving only those rights which can be exercised
consistently with the other provisions of the Act and its general
objectives.
If the objective of uniformity is to be accorded weight in con-
struing the Act, only two implications are available. One would be
to construe Section 1106 literally, but subject to an implied primary
jurisdiction in the CAB to make necessary determinations of validity.
This construction would complete the analogy to the pattern provided
by Part I of the ICA, minus only a power in the Board to award repara-
tions. The other alternative is that adopted by many of the State
courts in construing their regulatory acts, i.e., to say that rights and
remedies provided by the Act are exclusive and have superseded any
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common-law right to relief from unlawful tariff provisions involved
in past transactions.
The choice between these two alternatives is really a choice be-
tween partial uniformity and complete uniformity. The preserva-
tion of a common-law right to damages, or the right to avoid an un-
lawful tariff provision, no doubt affords an additional sanction with
which to enforce the statutory duty of carriers to publish only lawful
rates and rules. It does, however, destroy the possibility of achieving
complete uniformity. A simple example will show this. If the rate
charged during a given period were later found to be excessive and
unlawful, recognition of a common-law right to damages for the excess
over the reasonable rate would provide relief only to those shippers
who filed their actions within the allowed time. Even though the
danger of diverse decisions were avoided by application of the primary
jurisdiction doctrine, many thousands of shippers who were charged
that rate during the period of its invalidity would not for one reason
or another, obtain relief to which they were entitled. Some might not
know of the availability of the remedy. Some might feel that the
amount recoverable would not justify the expense of litigation. But
whatever the explanation, it is virtually certain that the number
of shippers who obtained relief would be relatively small, compared
to the total number who were injured by the unlawfulness of the
rate. To recognize their right to damages, therefore, is to grant
to those shippers who pursue their remedy a preference over those
who do not. It seems obvious, therefore, that adoption of the first
alternative cannot, as a practicar matter, produce complete uniformity
of treatment. On the contrary, it is certain to result in preferences
for those passengers and shippers who are either sufficiently diligent
or sufficiently litigious to pursue their remedies in every case.
On the other hand, the second alternative guarantees complete
uniformity of treatment for all. As long as the tariff provision re-
mains in effect, it is binding on all. The only relief is prospective,
and that relief redounds to the benefit of all. Certainly, then, the
second alternative is the more consistent with the general purposes of
the Act. And it gives effect, as the first does not, to the differences in
the provisions of the Civil Aeronautics Act and Part I of the ICA-
differences which, under the normal rules of statutory construction,
must be regarded as deliberate and significant.
It may be claimed that if the second construction were adopted,
the passenger or shipper who had been injured by an unlawful tariff
provision would be left without a remedy. But the public is not
left to the mercy of the carriers. The Civil Aeronautics Act provides
a comprehensive system of controls and supervision which adequately
safeguards the public from breaches of duty by carriers. The carriers
must file and publish tariffs163 containing all their rates and rules.
163 Sec. 403(a); 52 Stat. 992, 49 USCA §483(a) (Supp. 1947).
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Thus the public receives notice of the complete terms upon which
transportation is offered. Strict observance of the tariff as filed is
required of the carrier. 6 4  Any departure from the tariff is made a
criminal offense, 16 5 and the carrier may not change any filed tariff
except after thirty days' notice of the proposed change, unless the
Board, in the public interest, allows such a change upon shorter no-
tice.'66 As a further guarantee of equality of treatment, a positive
duty is imposed on the carrier to establish and observe just and reas-
onable tariff provisions, 67 and discrimination resulting from appli-
cation of the tariffs is prohibited. 168
But the Act does not rely solely upon the voluntary compliance by
the carrier with statutory duties. The Board is authorized, upon its
own initiative or upon complaint by the public, to suspend a tariff
provision before it takes effect, if it has reason to believe that the
provision does not comply with the requirements of the Act. 69 Fur-
thermore, even after the tariff provision has taken effect, the Board
has authority to conduct investigations of 1 70 the lawfulness of the
provision, either upon its own initiative or upon complaint, and
if it finds the tariff provision to be unlawful, it may prescribe the
lawful provision thereafter to become effective. 17 1 The public, there-
fore, has been provided for its protection with a full arsenal of reme-
dies, both preventive and punitiveY.
7 2
164 Sec. 403 (b).
165 Sec. 902(a) and (d).
166 Sec. 403 (c).
167 Sec. 404(a).
168 Sec. 404 (b).
169 Sec. 1002 (g).
170 Sec. 1002(a) and (b).
171 Sec. 1002 (d).
172 In construing the state statutes containing similar comprehensive provi-
sions, the courts, generally, have recognized that the statutory provisions com-
pletely safeguard the rights of the public. Purcell v. New York C. R. R., 197
N. E. 182 (N. Y., 1935) ; Mathieson Alkali Works, Inc. v. N. & W. Ry., 137 S. E.
608 (Va., 1927); see Commonwealth ex rel. Appalachia v. Old Dominion Power
Co., Inc., 34 S. E. 2d 364 (Va., 1945). The court in State ex rel. Standard Oil Co.
v. Dept. of Public Works, 53 P. 2d 318, 319 (Wash., 1936), in denying a power of
the department to award reparation based on unreasonable charges prior to the
date of the complaint (the statute conferred such power only after complaint),
summed up the reasons as follows:
"This court, in its construction of our statutes relating tb the subject
matter, has reached a different conclusion. The difference between a legal
and a lawful rate is not recognized, but, on the contrary, the rates specified
in the schedules filed and in effect are held to be the only lawful rates and re-
main such as long as they are effective.
"The appellant argues that to deny recovery as against an allegedly
unreasonable rate, prior to the date of filing a complaint with the depart-
ment, is in effect the denial of a common law right and leaves a wrong with-
out a remedy. But our statute requires that all rates be reasonable, and to
insure this, prescribes that they be filed and published with the regulatory
authority for a named period before their effective date, so that everyone con-
cerned may have notice with an opportunity to challenge them; and the
department of public works may, upon its own motion, suspend them pending
investigation. They are also subject to challenge after their effective date by
anyone affected. So long as they remain effective and unchallenged, they are
presumed to be reasonable . . . Without further analysis, we think that the
statute law, when read and considered as a whole, leads to the view, and we
must hold, that when a rate is filed, published, and permitted to become effec-
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The conclusion that a tariff provision properly filed under the
Civil Aeronautics Act cannot be avoided or invalidated retroactively
seems inescapable. To recognize existence of such a power in either
the CAB or the courts would defeat one of the principal purposes of
the Act-uniformity of treatment. In the face of legislative history,
constructions placed upon similar state statutes, and provisions of
the Act itself, it is believed that the remedies specifically provided by
the Act were designed to be exclusive. As a result, a tariff is equally
binding on both parties as long as it remains in effect. It is the con-
tract of carriage and is unimpeachable until changed.
tive by the department, it is and remains, until challenged in the manner pro-
vided by statute, the lawful rate and the only rate to' be charged and collected.
. . Otherwise, the carrier would never know what its lawful earnings were
and could never allocate its earnings to betterment and dividends without the
possibility of being embarrassed by delayed orders to make restitution. It
cannot be the legislative intent that its only protection in that respect is the
two-year limitation contained in the statute. Therefore, when a schedule is
challenged, that challenge should affect the scheduled rates only from the
date of the filing of the complaint."
